A Systemic Assessment of the European Offshore Wind Innovation: Insights from the Netherlands, Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom by LUO LIN et al.
  
A Systemic Assessment of the European 
Offshore Wind Innovation 
Insights from the Netherlands, 
Denmark, Germany and the 
United Kingdom 
Lin Luo
1
, Roberto Lacal-Arantegui
1
, Anna J. 
Wieczorek
2
, Simona O. Negro
2
, Robert Harmsen
2
, 
Gaston J. Heimeriks
2
 and Marko P. Hekkert
2
 
 
1
JRC -- Institute for Energy and Transport 
2
Copernicus Institute of Sustainable Development, 
Utrecht University 
 
2012  
Report EUR 25410 EN
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
European Commission 
Joint Research Centre 
Institute for Energy and Transport 
 
Contact information 
Lin Luo 
Address: Joint Research Centre, P.O.Box 2, 1755ZG Petten, The Netherlands 
E-mail: lin.luo@ec.europa.eu 
Tel.: +31 224 565309 
Fax: +31 224 565616 
 
http://iet.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ 
http://www.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ 
 
This publication is a Scientific and Policy Report by the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission. 
 
Legal Notice 
Neither the European Commission nor any person acting on behalf of the Commission 
is responsible for the use which might be made of this publication. 
 
Europe Direct is a service to help you find answers to your questions about the European Union 
Freephone number (*): 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 
(*) Certain mobile telephone operators do not allow access to 00 800 numbers or these calls may be billed. 
 
A great deal of additional information on the European Union is available on the Internet. 
It can be accessed through the Europa server http://europa.eu/. 
 
JRC73066 
 
EUR 25410 EN 
 
ISBN 978-92-79-25613-4 (pdf) 
ISBN 978-92-79-25614-1 (print) 
 
ISSN 1018-5593 (print) 
ISSN 1831-9424 (online) 
 
doi:10.2790/58937 
 
Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2012 
 
© European Union, 2012 
 
Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. 
Cover photo © Hans Hillewaert/CC-BY-SA-3.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/). 
Printed in the Netherlands 
   1 
 
 
Table of Contents 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 3 
1.1. Rationale and the focus of the study 3 
1.2. Methodological aspects 4 
1.3. Composition of the report 5 
1.4. Acknowledgements 5 
2. STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 6 
2.1. Actors 6 
2.1.1. Governmental agencies 6 
2.1.2. Knowledge institutes 8 
2.1.3. Educational organisations 9 
2.1.4. Industrial actors 12 
2.1.5. Support organisations 20 
2.2. Networks 21 
2.2.1. Knowledge networks 21 
2.2.2. Lobby (political) networks 25 
2.2.3. Industrial networks 26 
2.3. Institutions 27 
2.3.1. Renewable energy target 27 
2.3.2. Financial incentives offshore wind farms 27 
2.3.3. Infrastructure policies 28 
2.3.4. Expectations and social acceptance 29 
2.4. Infrastructure 30 
2.4.1. Knowledge infrastructure 30 
2.4.2. Physical infrastructure 33 
2.4.3. Financial infrastructure 40 
3. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 41 
3.1. Entrepreneurial experimentation (F1) 42 
3.1.1. Are there sufficient and suitable types of actors contributing to entrepreneurial 
experimentation? 42 
3.1.2. Are the amount and type of activities of the actors sufficient? 43 
3.1.3. How does the function score? 43 
3.2. Knowledge development (F2) 45 
3.2.1. Are there enough actors involved in knowledge development and are they suitable? 45 
3.2.2. Is the knowledge sufficiently developed and aligned with needs? 46 
3.2.3. How does the function score? 47 
   2 
3.3. Knowledge diffusion (F3) 47 
3.3.1. Are there enough different types of networks through which knowledge can diffuse? 47 
3.3.2. How does the function score? 48 
3.4. Guidance of the search (F4) 49 
3.4.1. Are there enough and suitable actors who provide guidance of the search? 49 
3.4.2. Do the soft institutions provide enough guidance of the search? 50 
3.4.3. Do the hard institutions provide enough guidance of the search? 51 
3.4.4. How does the function score? 52 
3.5. Market formation (F5) 53 
3.5.1. Is the size of the market sufficient and are there adequate incentives? 53 
3.5.2. How does the function score? 54 
3.6. Resource mobilization (F6) 54 
3.6.1. What is the availability of financial resources? 55 
3.6.2. What is the availability of competencies and expertise? 56 
3.6.3. Is the physical infrastructure sufficient? 56 
3.6.4. How does the function score? 57 
3.7. Legitimacy creation (F7) 59 
3.7.1. Do the hard and soft institutions increase legitimacy? 59 
3.7.2. Is there resistance towards the technology, project set up or permit procedure? 60 
3.7.3. How does the function score? 60 
3.8. Functional dynamics in 2011 61 
4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 63 
4.1. What hinders the functioning of the innovation systems? 63 
4.2. Systemic policy challenges in the European offshore wind innovation system 66 
REFERENCES 68 
ANNEX 1 69 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   3 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Rationale and the focus of the study 
The development and diffusion of offshore wind energy technology is important for 
European energy policy. Firstly, there is a large amount of potential; the European Wind 
Energy Association (EWEA) expects 150 GW of offshore wind capacity to be realized in 
2030, which would supply 14% of Europe’s electricity demand (EWEA, 2011a). The 
technical potential of offshore wind is estimated at 5800 GW (EEA, 2009) and allows for 
even further expansion after 2030. Offshore wind has thus the possibility of becoming an 
important pillar of the future European energy system, contributing to policy objectives on 
climate change, energy security, green growth and social progress1 . Secondly, the 
technology is in the early stages of technological development and, therefore, many 
business opportunities can be reaped in this emerging sector. However, a large potential 
does not automatically lead to a large share in future energy systems; neither does an 
emergent stage of technological development automatically lead to success for companies 
and the related economic growth and growth in employment. Innovation and technological 
change are by definition very uncertain processes. The outcomes are strongly determined 
by processes of chance and by external events that can hardly be influenced. Nevertheless, 
the scientific community that studies innovation has shown that a conscious and intelligent 
management of innovation processes strongly increases the success chances of innovation. 
 
The most important insight that has dominated the field of innovation studies in the recent 
decades is the fact that innovation is a collective activity and takes place within the context 
of an ‘innovation system’. The success chances of innovations are, to a large extent, 
determined by how the innovation system is built up and how it functions. Many 
innovation systems are characterized by flaws that hamper the development and diffusion 
of innovations. These flaws are often labelled as system failures or system problems. 
Intelligent innovation policy therefore evaluates how innovation systems are functioning, 
tries to create insight into the systems’ weaknesses and develops policies accordingly. 
 
To increase the success chances of offshore wind technology, both in terms of the share in 
the future energy system and the economic benefits for businesses, it is necessary to study 
the innovation system for offshore wind energy, evaluate how the system functions and 
identify the problems that need to be addressed by policy. There have been a number of 
models developed to study innovation from various perspectives. In this report we use the 
Technological Innovation System approach (TIS) and in particular a systemic policy 
framework (see Annex 1) developed by Utrecht University in the Netherlands in 
cooperation with other European institutes like Chalmers University in Sweden and 
EAWAG in Switzerland. We analyse the state of the European offshore wind innovation 
system at the end of 2011, based on insights from four European countries: the UK, 
Denmark (DK), the Netherlands (NL) and Germany (DE). The report aims to identify 
weaknesses that hinder the development of the system and in so doing support national 
and European policy making in the area of offshore wind energy.  
                                                        
1 As outlined in the EC Innovation Union http://ec.europa.eu/research/innovation-union/index_en.cfm accessed 27 Apr 2012. 
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1.2. Methodological aspects 
To enable a precise understanding of this report, the reader should be aware of the 
following methodological issues:  
 
The first issue is the selection of the countries for analysis. At the time of the analysis (end 
2011) the four countries that had the largest online offshore wind capacity in Europe were: 
the UK – 1589 MW, Denmark – 854 MW, the Netherlands – 247 MW and Germany – 195 
MW. However, when these numbers are complemented with data on offshore wind 
capacity under construction, consented and planned till 30 June 2011, the two leading 
countries became the UK with a total of 48.6 GW and Germany with 31.2 GW. The 
Netherlands and Denmark with 5992 MW and 2471 MW lose their leading position to 
countries like Sweden, Norway and France (EWEA, 2011a). For our analysis we decided to 
focus on the UK, Denmark, the Netherlands and Germany because of the varying strategies 
that these countries deployed and the different circumstances that led two of them (the UK 
and Germany) to progress rapidly, and the other two (Denmark and the Netherlands) to 
lower the speed of their offshore wind development. 
 
Secondly, the report depends to a great extent on the Global Offshore Wind Farms 
Database 4C (further referred to as 4C database) version October 2010. We have used this 
database to map the structure of the four analysed innovation systems, namely the actors, 
physical infrastructure and capital costs. At the time of the analysis, it was the most recent 
version of the database available. However, due to the length of time between October 
2010 and the end of 2011, there may have been some adjustments to the composition of 
the innovation systems that are not captured by the database. Another implication of 
following the 4C database is that if entries are missing in the database, they do not show up 
in our analysis either. We have chosen not to complement the analysis with the missing 
data for three reasons:  
 
1. It is expected that the missing data does not alter the main conclusions of our 
analysis.  
2. For methodological consistency we decided to follow one solid source of 
information.  
3. Although this report has been prepared with great care, it is not intend to be 
exhaustive. Since we aim to present the general view of the analysed systems, we 
have mapped only the most important actors and circumstances that have had an 
impact on the development of the four innovation systems. 
Thirdly, next to the data obtained from the 4C database and various reports, publications 
and internet sources, we have carried out a series of interviews with about 30 actors 
involved in the field. Furthermore, 10 reviewers, engaged in the offshore wind innovation 
system, have reviewed the earlier draft of this report. The review process was an 
additional source of qualitative information about how the system functions and what 
challenges it faces. 
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Fourthly, as much as it was possible to draw conclusions about nationally delimited TISs in 
the UK, Denmark, the Netherlands and Germany, our conclusions for the European offshore 
wind innovation system are purely based on analysis of these four countries.  
 
Finally, the time and resources allocated to this study did not allow for a deeper analysis of 
e.g. financial infrastructure, soft institutions (such as expectations, promises, routines) or 
interactions at the level of bi- or tri-lateral collaborations. More in depth interviews would 
be necessary to acquire this type of information. For the same reasons this report does not 
present and discuss the design of a systemic instrument that would address the identified 
weaknesses in the offshore wind innovation system.  
1.3. Composition of the report 
The report is composed of four sections following the steps as described in the manual for 
analysts presented in Annex 1. Firstly, in Section 2, we look into the structure of the 
innovation systems in the UK, Denmark, the Netherlands and Germany. In particular we 
study which actors are involved in the offshore wind systems (actors – section 2.1); how 
various actors cooperate with each other (networks – section 2.2.); what the national 
regulatory framework consists of; what the expectations and social acceptance are 
(institutions – section 2.3); and what the state of the knowledge, physical and financial 
infrastructure is in the four countries (infrastructure – section 2.4). Secondly, in Section 3 
we analyse how the various systems function. For that purpose we use a set of seven 
evaluation criteria that in the literature have been labelled as ‘functions of innovation 
systems’. We analyse each function based on the available data and the insights from 30 
stakeholders’ interviews and 10 reviews of the draft report. Finally, in Section 4 we identify 
the system weaknesses that block the proper functioning of the offshore wind innovation 
systems and which, for that reason, require urgent and coordinated policy effort.  
1.4. Acknowledgements 
This report is based on a study commissioned to Utrecht University under a service 
contract (Service Contract 108423 – NL-Petten: Study on Assessment of Innovation System 
of European Wind Energy, 2011).  Dr. Lin Luo and Mr. Roberto Lacal-Arantegui from the 
JRC acted as project coordinators and co-authored the report. The authorship team at 
Utrecht University comprised Anna J. Wieczorek, Simona O. Negro, Robert Harmsen, Gaston 
J. Heimeriks and Marko P. Hekkert. The authors of this report would like to thank Sylvian 
Watts-Jones for his substantial and valuable contributions that helped us prepare and 
finalize this document. We are also indebted to a number of (offshore wind) experts for the 
time they allocated in early 2012 to review and comment on the earlier draft of this report. 
Particularly, we would like to acknowledge numerous contributions and revisions by: Eize 
de Vries (Rotation Consultancy, consultant for Windpower Monthly), Ernst van Zuijlen 
(Flow, NWEA); Theo de Lange (Van Oord); Staffan Jacobsson (Gothenburg University, 
Sweden); Athanasia Arapogianni (EWEA, Brussels); Morten Holmager (Offshore Center, 
Denmark); Michiel Heemskerk (Rabobank); Evangelos Tzimas (JRC), Kiti Suomalainen 
(JRC); Ad van Wijk (TU Delft). 
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2. Structural analysis 
Each innovation system consists of four types of components: actors, networks, institutions 
and infrastructure (physical, knowledge, financial). In this section we analyse the structure 
of the UK, Danish, Dutch and German offshore wind Technological Innovation Systems 
(TIS).  
2.1. Actors 
Actors through their choices and actions generate, diffuse and utilize technologies. Their 
presence and capabilities directly or indirectly contribute to the system development as 
well as influence its pace and direction. According to EWEA (2011b), in 2010 offshore wind 
energy employed almost 35000 people in Europe (EU-27) directly and indirectly while the 
installed capacity was 2.94 GW. EWEA expects in its baseline scenario that in 2020 40 GW 
of offshore wind will be installed requiring 170000 people to work in the field. 
 
In this section we analyse who is involved in the offshore wind innovation system and in 
what capacity. Five different categories of actors are distinguished and mapped in this 
report: governmental bodies, knowledge institutes, educational organizations, industry and 
support organisations. The analysis is not exhaustive. We include only the most important 
actors that have been involved in the offshore wind innovation systems until 2011. For 
each national offshore wind innovation system we distinguish between national actors 
(located in the country under study) and foreign actors (involved in an offshore wind 
project in the country under study but not located in that country). The labelling of some of 
the actors as national or foreign, especially when they are multinational companies, has 
been based on whether the company has a subsidiary in the country. For that reason for 
example Vestas, a Danish company, can also be found in the Dutch value chain or Siemens 
Wind Power (a subsidiary of the German Siemens) in the Danish value chain. 
2.1.1. Governmental agencies 
Offshore wind is a relatively new field for the governments in all four analysed countries. 
The role of the government is broadly the development and administration of legislation, 
permission procedures and consenting. In various countries different ministries and 
agencies carry out the specific tasks. 
Whereas in Denmark all processes are 
concentrated in one organisation, in the 
UK many different ministries and 
governmental agencies are responsible 
for different aspects of the offshore 
wind procedure. Also in Germany, there 
are a large number of authorities 
involved in the offshore wind 
procedures, but the German 
government is working on combining 
the licensing for offshore wind farms into a single procedure. From the perspective of the 
European offshore wind innovation system, the involvement of a great number of national 
governmental agencies in the administration of offshore wind process is not very efficient 
for its development and may need to be reduced. Table 1 presents an overview of 
Whereas in Denmark the entire process is 
governed by one agency, in the UK, the 
Netherlands and Germany many different 
ministries are responsible for different 
aspects of the offshore wind procedure 
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governmental bodies that deal with offshore wind in the UK, Denmark, the Netherlands and 
Germany and the National TSO’s (Transmission System Operators). 
 
Table 1. Overview of TSOs and governmental bodies relevant for offshore wind 
Country TSO Governmental organisation Responsibility 
- The Crown Estate Owner of the seabed - any offshore 
wind farm needs a Crown Estate 
lease 
- Department of Energy and 
Climate Change (DECC, 
formerly: DTI) 
- Scottish Government 
- The Department of Enterprise, 
Trade and Investment (DETI) 
Introduction of the Renewable 
Obligation (RO) Scheme 
- Office of Gas and Electricity 
Management (OFGEM) 
- Northern Ireland Authority for 
Utility Regulation 
Accreditation of Renewable 
Obligation Certificates 
- Secretary of State for Energy 
and Climate Change (England 
and Wales2) 
- Minister for the Environment 
(Northern Ireland) 
- Scottish Minister for Enterprise, 
Energy & Tourism 
- Marine Management 
Organisation (MMO)3 
Consents (legal, building, spatial 
planning) 
UK - National Grid 
plc 
- System 
Operator for 
Northern 
Ireland 
(SONI) 
- Scottish and 
Southern 
Energy (SSE) 
- Scottish 
Power 
Transmission 
plc 
- MMO (England and Wales)  
- Northern Ireland Department 
Consents (legal, building, spatial 
planning) 
Denmark - Energinet.dk - Danish Energy Agency under 
responsibility of Climate and 
Energy Ministry  
Developing and administering 
legislation, tenders for offshore wind 
farms, consents (legal, building, 
spatial planning) and grid 
connection authorisation  
- Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
Agriculture and Innovation  
Subsidy Sustainable Energy (SDE) 
and electrical infrastructure 
- The Ministry of Infrastructure 
and the Environment 
Consents (legal, building, spatial 
planning in the North Sea) and 
allocation of environmental permits  
Netherlands - TenneT B.V. 
- AgencyNL Revenue approval (tender) and 
revenue execution (offshore wind 
subsidy scheme and tax related 
policy) 
                                                        
2 Unless consented by Welsh Ministers under the Transport & Works Act. 
3 Ibid. 
   8 
- Federal Ministry for the 
Environment, Nature 
Conservation and Nuclear 
Safety (BMU) 
- Federal Ministry of Transport, 
Building and Urban Affairs 
(BMVBS)  
- Federal Maritime and 
Hydrographic Authority (BSH) 
Developing and administering 
legislation, tenders for offshore wind 
farms, consents (legal, building, 
spatial planning) and grid 
connection authorisation 
- Federal authority for nature 
conservation (BfN) 
Environmental permits allocation 
Germany  - EnBW 
Transportnet
ze AG 
- TenneT TSO 
GmbH  
- Amprion 
GmbH 
(formerly 
RWE) 
- Transportnet
z Strom 
GmbH 
- Federal Grid Agency Revenue execution: FGA is the 
supervising authority for the feed-in 
tariff (reports to BMU who monitors 
the law) 
2.1.2. Knowledge institutes 
Knowledge institutes include universities, technology centres, research centres and 
institutes. Consultancies are included in the support organisations category. 
 
The purpose of this section is to identify the main knowledge institutes that perform 
research on offshore wind in the four analysed countries4. For that purpose we screened 
journal publications, as archived in the Web of Science from Thomson Scientific between 
1994 and 2010, with offshore wind as a topic indication. We summarised major results of 
our research in Table 2. This table presents: (i) the total number of knowledge institutes 
per country, (ii) the total number of publications on offshore wind per analysed country, 
and (iii) the top three organisations publishing in the field per country including the 
number of publications per institute and the national percentage (between brackets). 
 
Table 2. Number of knowledge institutes and scientific publications on offshore wind 
by the UK, Danish, Dutch and German actors (1994-2010)5 
Country Total no of 
organizations 
Total no of 
publications 
Most important organizations (incl. 
number of publications and national 
percentage) 
UK 170 451 Univ Durham (21, 5 %) 
Univ Strathclyde Scotland (18, 4%) 
Univ Oxford (16, 4% ) 
Denmark 66 236 Risø Natl Lab (68, 29%) 
Univ Aalborg (33, 14%) 
Tech Univ Denmark (32, 14%) 
Netherlands  43 140 Delft Univ Technol (44, 31%) 
Univ Utrecht (13,9% ) 
ECN (13, 9%) 
Germany 194 426 Univ Bremen (28, 7%) 
Leibniz Univ Hannover (23, 5%) 
Alfred Wegener Inst Polar & Marine Res (22, 
5%) 
                                                        
4 The impact of produced knowledge (both codified and tacit) is discussed in section 2.4.1 (knowledge infrastructure). 
5 A note on multi-organisation papers: a joint paper by two research organisations from the same country is computed once in 
the country profile and once for each of the author organisations. 
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Our analysis shows that the total 
number of knowledge institutes 
involved in publishing in both 
Denmark (66) and the Netherlands 
(43) is much lower than in Germany 
(194) and the UK (170). However, the 
Danish and the Dutch knowledge 
institutes rank highest internationally 
in terms of the number of publications on offshore wind. In particular, the Danish Risø 
National Lab for Sustainable Energy and the Dutch Delft University of Technology (TU 
Delft) excel in their number of journal articles per institute (68 and 44 respectively). Risø 
ranks 6th while TU Delft is 13th in the world (Web of Science, Thompson Scientific). Two 
other Danish universities follow Risø and TU Delft: Aalborg University (33 publications) 
and Technical University Denmark (DTU) (32 articles). 
In Germany knowledge institutes involved in the field specialise in different aspects of 
offshore wind technology. Most well known for its track record in the field is the University 
of Bremen. It specialises in material science and production engineering and with 28 
articles on offshore wind it ranks 23rd worldwide. Bremen is followed by Leibniz University 
Hannover (23 papers) on developing systems for determining physical parameters for 
offshore wind farms and the Alfred Wegener Institute for Polar and Marine Research (22 
articles), which specialises in research on integrating aquaculture in offshore wind farms 
and the impact of offshore wind farms on the marine environment.  
In the UK the production of 
scientific codified knowledge is 
very scattered, and the UK 
knowledge institutes rank lowest 
of all four analysed countries in 
terms of publications on offshore 
wind. The highest ranked UK 
organisation and only one that has more than 20 publications is Durham University (41st 
worldwide). The Energy Group of the School of Engineering and Computing Sciences is 
particularly active in research associated with the commercial development of wind power 
and especially the reliability and condition monitoring of 2-10 MW wind turbines. Durham 
University is followed by Strathclyde University in Scotland (18 articles) and Oxford 
University (16 articles). All remaining UK organisations score below 20 papers with very 
many of the institutes having only 1 or 2 publications. 
2.1.3. Educational organisations 
The list of educational organizations delivering courses dedicated to renewable energy, 
and wind in particular, is long and 
growing in both educational 
categories: vocational and academic. 
However, only a small number of 
programmes specialize in the 
particular needs of the offshore wind 
sector. Table 3 presents an overview 
of major educational organisations that offer courses on renewables that are relevant for 
Offshore wind educational courses are 
few and recently developed 
Public research organisations lead in 
publishing on offshore wind. Particularly 
Risø and TU Delft  
There are less Danish and Dutch knowledge 
institutes than in Germany and the UK but 
they publish most in the international context 
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the offshore wind sector. This overview does not include organisations that offer 
individually arranged education (such as PhDs). 
 
Table 3. Organizations offering renewable energy courses relevant for offshore wind 
field6  
Country Vocational courses Academic/ 
Polytechnic 
BSC level 
Academic/ 
Polytechnic 
MSc level 
Academic/ 
Polytechnic 
PhD 
UK Nat Ren Energy Centre 
(NAREC) 
Northumberland 
College 
Lowesift College* 
Falk Nutec* 
East Coast Training 
Services* 
Siemens* 
Univ of Exeter 
Univ of Cumbria* 
Univ of Birmingham 
Univ of Nottingham 
Univ of Dundee* 
Cranfield University* 
Loughborough Univ 
Swansea Univ 
Univ of Birmingham 
Univ of Centr 
Lancashire 
Univ of Dundee* 
Univ of Edinburgh* 
Univ of Exeter* 
Univ of Leeds 
Univ of Nottingham 
UK Energy Research 
Center* 
Univ of Dundee* 
Univ of Central 
Lancashire* 
University of 
Strathclyde* 
Denmark Danish Univ Wind 
Energy Training 
(DUWET)* 
Offshore Center 
Denmark* 
Survival Training 
Center* 
AMU-Vest* 
Falck Nutec* 
Maersk Training Centre 
A/S* 
EUC Vest* 
Danish Wind Power 
Academy* 
Business Academy 
South-West* 
Aalborg Univ* 
Techn Univ Denmark* 
Risø * 
Techn Univ 
Denmark* 
Nether-
lands 
Hoogeschool van 
Arnhem and Nijmegen 
(HAN)* 
Maritime Campus NL* 
NHL* 
ROC Kop Noord 
Holland* 
DUWIND* 
DHTC* 
Ascent Safety* 
Van Oord Academy* 
Hogeschool Den Bosch 
Delft Univ of Techn* 
(HAN)* 
Outsmart* 
Delft Univ of Techn* Delft Univ of Techn* 
Germany Education Centre for 
Renewable Energies 
(BZEE)* 
Ren Agency RENAC 
Deutsches Wind Energy 
Institute 
ForWind* 
Edwin Academy 
Univ of Kassel 
Deutsche WindGuard* 
Falck Nutec* 
 Aachen Univ of Applied 
Sciences 
Univ of Applied 
Sciences Bremerhaven 
Univ of Flensburg 
Univ of Hanover 
Univ of Kiel  
Univ of Oldenburg 
Univ of Applied 
Sciences Hamburg 
Univ of Applied 
Oldenburg Univ 
Univ Stuttgart* 
Vestas 
(professorship)* 
Schleswig Holstein 
(professorship)* 
Univ of Applied 
Sciences Hamburg 
                                                        
6 Based on Wind Power Offshore Careers Guide (2012) and websites of the organizations accessed on 2 Feb 2012. 
   11 
Moog Sciences Saarbrücken 
European/ 
Internatio
nal 
GL Garrad Hassan* 
World Wide Energy 
Institute 
 
 European wind energy 
Master (EWEM) (4 
techn Univ in North 
Europe)* 
EUREC & 8 Univ 
Siemens* 
European Academy of 
Wind Energy EAWE* 
 
(*) Denotes that the organisation gives a dedicated offshore wind module, specialization or introduction 
within their educational programmes portfolio 
Academic and polytechnic training in offshore wind in Denmark and the Netherlands is, as 
in the case of research, concentrated in a comparatively small number of organisations, 
namely at DTU, Risø and Aalborg University in Denmark and TU Delft in the Netherlands. 
These organisations have been the forerunners in enrolling and releasing yearly a number 
of individual master and PhD graduates with a specialisation in various aspects of offshore 
wind. They also give annual dedicated master programmes with focus on- or with 
specialisation in- offshore wind technology. 
 
Germany and the UK do not have a 
very long tradition in offering 
education in offshore wind energy. 
However, since both countries are 
expected to lead European offshore 
wind development in the coming 
years (EWEA, 2011a) they have 
taken serious measures to address 
the demand voiced by industry, 
especially for qualified engineers. 
For example, in 2011, £6.5 million was allocated to engineering education in the UK in the 
hope of ushering in a generation of competent renewable energy workers. As a result, 
several UK universities (University of Edinburgh, Strathclyde and Exeter) have been 
preparing doctorate programmes starting in 2012 for up to 50 engineering students in 
technical aspects, as well as, in business and economics of offshore wind energy. In 
Germany, the Education Centre for Renewable Energies (BZEE) recently developed a 
qualification programme dedicated to the service and maintenance of offshore wind farms. 
Vestas provided funding for a new endowed professorship for wind energy technology, to 
be based at Flensburg University of Applied Sciences on the basis of a public-private 
partnership (Vestas, 20107). A great number of master and bachelor courses as well as 
individually arranged PhDs are expected at many German and the UK universities in 2012. 
Most of these courses are not dedicated offshore wind programmes. Offshore wind 
constitutes only a part of the renewable technology educational portfolio of the educational 
organisations. Many of these courses 
have a strong focus on the technical 
aspects of offshore wind energy. 
 
A growing number of vocational 
courses are offered in all four of the 
analysed countries. Contrary to the 
                                                        
7 http://www.vestas.com/Files/Billeder/countrysites/Germany/wind10_ENG.pdf, accessed 2 Feb 2012. 
Denmark and the Netherlands are 
frontrunners in academic and polytechnic 
training in offshore wind. Germany and 
the UK are catching up in expectation of 
rapid market development 
Vocational training is offered mainly by 
companies and often by those serving 
offshore industry 
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academic education, vocational training is mainly given by companies or is results from 
collaboration between industry, government bodies and knowledge institutes. For example 
as the outcome of such a partnership, NAREC, the UK National Renewable Energy Centre 
for renewable energy development and testing, has opened a new training tower which is 
designed to provide academic and industrial training programmes for technicians in the 
wind industry. The programme has a strong focus on the offshore sector. Furthermore, 
many vocational courses are given by training centers assisting the oil and gas industry. 
These are mainly health, safety, survival and environment courses and they serve well the 
transfer of skills from the oil and gas sector to the offshore wind sector. Some of them, such 
as, for example one given by the German GL Garrad Hassan, are now internationally known. 
At the European level, the European Academy of Wind Energy (EAWE) provides many 
courses on offshore wind. EAWE is a 
registered body of research institutes 
and universities in Europe (the UK, 
Denmark, the Netherlands and Germany 
included) working on wind energy 
research and development. The aim of 
EAWE is twofold: to be a world leading 
wind energy academic and research 
community; and maintaining Europe at the forefront of wind energy pre-competitive 
innovation (EAWE, 20128) worldwide. European Wind Energy MSc (EWEM) within 
Erasmus Mundus is another pan-European master programme run by TU Delft, DTU, 
Norwegian University of Science and Technology, and the Carl von Ossietzky University 
Oldenburg. EWEM aims to educate 120-150 MSc graduates per year, covering the top 1-2% 
global demand for wind energy professionals with a post-graduate education9. Finally, the 
POWER Cluster project (Pushing Offshore Wind Energy Regions) comprising of eighteen 
partners from six countries (the UK, Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany, Norway and 
Sweden) and its sister project ‘South Baltic Offshore Wind Energy Regions’ (due in 2013), 
have both been promoting the enhancement of educational possibilities in offshore wind. 
2.1.4. Industrial actors 
To illustrate the involvement of the key industrial actors in the UK, Danish, Dutch and 
German offshore wind systems we use a value chain consisting of three broad steps. The 
first step is the development of the wind farms and it encompasses such actor categories as 
owners, project developers and managers of the farms. The second step is the construction 
phase, which includes installation contractors, component manufacturers and substation 
developers/suppliers. The third step is the operation and maintenance (O&M) covering all 
actors involved in the user phase of the farms. The following eight figures (Figures 1-8) 
present value chains of the four countries under study. In the first four (Figures 1-4) the 
focus is on showing the involvement of national actors in both national and international 
projects (actors’ perspective). Figures 5-8 show which actors (national or international) 
build national wind farms (wind farms’ perspective). As a source of data we use the 4C 
database (version October 2010). In case of multinational organisation we include it as a 
national actor whenever the company has subsidiaries in the country. For that reason, e.g. 
Vestas, can be found in the Dutch value chain while Siemens Wind Power in the Danish 
value chain. Given the geographical scope of this report and to keep clarity of the figures, 
the international category comprises of companies from the four analysed countries. That 
                                                        
8 www.eawe.eu accessed 2 Feb 2012. 
9 www.windenergymaster.eu accessed 2 Feb 2012. 
Countries in Europe cooperate on 
providing integrated trainings related 
with offshore wind such as EAWE and 
EWEM 
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means we do not list there companies from e.g. Belgium, the US or Spain. By project we 
mean a wind farm. 
 
Actors’ perspective 
 
Figure 1. Dutch actors involved in the national and international projects along the 
value chain10 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The UK actors involved in the national and international projects along the 
value chain11 
                                                        
10 One of the missing Dutch companies in the 4C database and in this figure is Econcern/Evelop. The company developed 
projects in UK (1), Belgium (1) and Germany (4) but went bankrupt and does not exist anymore (Ernst van Zuijlen, 2012). 
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Figure 3. German actors involved in the national and international projects along the 
value chain12 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Danish actors involved in the national and international projects along the 
value chain13 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
11 Missing in the 4C database and on this figure are foreign developers active in the UK such as WPD (DE) and Dong (DK). Also 
the SSE (UK) is active in the Netherlands but not mentioned under ‘international’ (Ernst van Zuijlen, 2012).  
12 Examples of companies that are not included in the 4C database and thus do not show up on this figure are: Aerodyn 
Energiesysteme (technology developer); RENK, Bosch-Rexroth and Winergy (suppliers of wind turbine gearboxes and additional 
components); Weier and VEM Sachsenwerk (generator suppliers), Schaeffler (FAG), Liebherr, IMO (bearing suppliers); 
Siempelkamp and MAN (heavy castings (hubs, bed frames, and main shafts) suppliers) (Eize de Vries, 2012). 
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As shown in Figures 1-4, the value chains in the four analysed countries are relatively 
complete with a variety of competent actors. Both incumbents14 as well as new entrants 
can be identified in all four 
countries.  
 
There are more Dutch companies, 
especially construction firms, 
present in the foreign value chains 
than the UK, Danish and German 
firms. Moreover, contrary to the UK, a greater number of Dutch companies are involved in 
international rather than domestic projects. This implies that the Netherlands has got a 
very well developed national construction (foundations, substations, and wind farm 
installation) industry (supply) and, as a consequence of national policy, a small home 
market (demand). The involvement of Danish and German companies in national and 
international projects is relatively 
equally spread. 
 
The development, operation and 
management of wind farms are 
predominantly done by national 
companies. The same can be said 
about the ownership of the projects. 
In all analysed countries there is a strong focus on ownership of national farms rather than 
international establishments. Furthermore, as shown in the figures (1-4) large utilities 
such as Nuon, Eneco, E-on, Centrica, RWE, Vattenfall, Dong Energy dominate as owners, 
developers and operators of the farms. This dominance is observable mostly in the UK 
(Markard and Petersen, 2010) and least in Germany where only 39% of approved offshore 
wind projects are owned by large 
utilities. The remaining shares in 
German wind farms are held by a 
great number of developers, 
financial investors and municipal 
utilities (KPMG, 2010). As such, 
Germany can be characterised by 
a more dispersed wind farm ownership structure compared to the UK, Denmark and the 
Netherlands. 
 
What is also noticeable in the four 
figures (1-4) is that there are a few 
established and financially stable oil 
and gas multinationals involved in 
offshore wind such as, Dutch van 
Oord and Shell (NL), Amec (UK) or 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
13 Missing companies are: Semco Maritime (Substation), Apro (Maintenance), LM Wind (Manufacturer), COWI (Substation), 
Grontmij, Carl Bro A/S (Substation), VSB Industri- og Stålmontage A/S (Manufacturer), Blue Water Shipping (Installer and 
Maintenance), Envision Energy (Chinese owned, but with development department in Denmark where they work on their new 
offshore tubine), Fyns Kran Udstyr (Manufacturer), Q-STAR ENERGY A/S (Maintenance), SubCPartner (Manufacturer and 
Maintenance), Knud E. Hansen A/S (Installer) (Morten Holmager, 2012). 
14 Incumbent in innovation studies denotes an existing, usually large, company that has stable position on the market. 
Contrary to the UK, the Dutch companies 
are very internationally oriented 
The development, ownership, operation 
and management of wind farms is mostly 
performed by national companies 
Large utilities dominate as owners, developers 
and operators particularly in the UK 
Many established offshore firms are present 
in the UK, Danish, Dutch and German 
projects 
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RWE (DE). Their involvement in the offshore wind may suggest that they are ready to 
expand their business into new fields. From an innovation perspective, involvement of such 
companies (incumbents) effectively serves the purposes of knowledge cross-fertilisation, 
investor confidence and eventually the expansion of the offshore wind market. 
 
Wind farms’ perspective 
 
In the following set of figures (Figures 5-8) we show which actors are involved in the 
development, construction and 
operation of national wind farms in the 
four analysed countries. What is clear 
is that even though the national wind 
farms are mostly owned and managed 
domestically, rarely are they 
constructed solely by national 
companies. The UK innovation system especially seems most open to foreign actors. As 
shown in Figure 6, there are more non-UK than UK companies all along the UK value chain. 
This is not surprising. The UK, unlike Germany and Denmark, does not have a single 
manufacturer of the required 3–7 MW+ wind turbines. Also, the supply chain for local 
components is small and not very complete (Eize de Vries, 2012), while in 2010/11 the UK 
had the highest installed capacity and more offshore wind farms than any other European 
country. That indicates that the UK has got a developed market (demand) but a small 
national industry (supply) (Douglas Westwood, 2010). 
 
With regards to suppliers of technology 
and in particular wind turbine 
manufacturers, Siemens and Vestas 
dominate in Europe, having supplied 
respectively 51% and 39% of 
installations in 2011. These two 
companies are followed by REpower15 
(3%), Areva (<1%) and Bard (1%) 
(Wind directions, 2012). EWEA (2011a) lists also a number of new entrants to the offshore 
turbine manufacturing business, such as Bard and Nordex (DE), who both develop large 6 
MW+ wind turbines although with very different fate. Other newcomers from outside of 
the four analysed countries but important for the entire European offshore wind 
innovation system include: Alstom, AMSC, Condor, DSME, Envision, Gamesa, GE, Goldwind, 
Northern Power Systems, Samsung, SCD (Ming Yang), Sinovel, Hyunday and XEMC–
Darwind (Eize de Vries, 2012; Ernst van Zuijlen, 2012). 
 
Similarly, the substructure supply is dominated by established suppliers such as BiFAB 
(UK), Bladt (DK) and Sif and Smulders (NL); with a number of new entrants such as 
Heerema (NL) and EEW, Strabag and Weserwind (DE) (EWEA, 2011a). Presence of new 
entrants in the system is important for increased levels of competition and technology 
price stabilisation. Their emergence indicates that the relatively complete value chains are 
also quite dynamic. 
 
                                                        
15 With major shares of Shuzlon (India). 
The UK innovation system is most open to 
foreign actors of all four systems 
Manufacturing of turbines and supply of 
substructures observe an increase of new 
entrants 
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The range of subsea high voltage 
cable suppliers is limited and none of 
the established suppliers are located 
in the analysed countries: 
Swiss/Swedish ABB, French Nexans 
and Italian Prysmian. German NKT 
and General Cable are the only new 
entrants to high voltage cable market.  
 
The leading suppliers of vessels in Europe are Danish A2Sea and Dutch Ballast Nedam, 
Seaway Heavy Lifting and Jumbo and the UK (MPI Offshore, Seajacks) and according to 
(EWEA, 2011a) there are hardly any new entrants in this field and none from any of the 
four analysed countries. However, according to Bloomberg New Energy Finance (2012), 11 
new vessels are programmed to start operating in Europe in 2012 and will work on 10 
offshore wind farms16. If the new vessels fail to start operating while the field develops 
further, the current cable and vessels suppliers may face manufacturing capacity limits 
(EWEA, 2011a).  
 
 
Figure 5. Dutch and international actors involved in the Dutch projects along the 
value chain 
                                                        
16 Offshore Wind Market Outlook, 13.01.12, http://www.docin.com/p-194017138.html accessed 27 Apr 2012. 
There are few new entrants in the area of 
high voltage subsea cables  
   18 
 
Figure 6. The UK and international actors involved in the UK projects along the value 
chain 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. German and international actors involved in the German projects along the 
value chain 
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Figure 8. Danish and international actors involved in the Danish projects along the 
value chain 
 
Furthermore, although the Dutch companies are main suppliers of vessels (they own a total 
of 20 vessels compared to Danish owning 10 vessels) (Athanasia Arapogianni, 2012), it is 
the Danish companies that are in the lead in terms of heavy vessel installation contracts in 
Europe (see Figure 9). Figure 9 also shows that the UK is the main installer of subsea 
cables. 
 
 
Figure 9. Number of cable installation (CI) and heavy vessel (HV) projects per 
country according to 4C Database (October 2010) 
   20 
2.1.5. Support organisations 
Support organisations are all organisations that are not covered by the above categories 
but that in some capacity do contribute to the development of the TIS. These are legal 
organisations, financial organisations/banks, intermediaries, knowledge brokers and 
consultancies. Table 4 shows the involvement of banks and consultancies in the offshore 
wind projects in the four analysed countries. 
Table 4. Overview of the most active offshore wind support organisations in the UK, 
Denmark, the Netherlands and Germany.  
Country Financial organisations National consultancies 
UK Lloyds Banking Group, Santander, UK’s 
Green Investment Bank, Centrica 
Energy 
ABP Marine Environmental Research Ltd 
(ABPmer), Anatec Ltd (12*), Atkins BMT 
Renewables Bomel Limited Bond Pearce (2), 
Dynpos Ltd, Gardline Environmental Limited 
(GEL) (3), Gardline Hydro GL, Garrad Hassan and 
Partners Ltd, Global Marine Systems Lt, HR 
Wallingford UK Ltd (2), Marine Ecological Survey 
(MES), MeteoGroup UK Metoc Plc (2), Mott 
MacDonald (7), Mwaves Ltd (2), Natural Power 
Consultants Ltd (2), NFFO Services Limited (7), 
Ocean Marine Services Ltd (4), Offshore Design 
Engineering (ODE) Ltd (3), PMSS (26), Royal 
Haskoning (2), RPS Group Plc Searoc UK LTD, 
SEtech (Geotechnical Engineers) Ltd (10), 
Siemens Transmission and Distribution Ltd (3), 
Titan Environmental Surveys (3), Warwick 
Energy Limited 
Denmark Danish Eksport Kredit Fonden, Nordic 
Investment Bank, Kirsten Gosvig’s 
pension fund, Pension Danmark, 
Brancor Capital Partners 
Spok ApS, NIRAS (22), Ramboll, COWI, Dansk 
IngeniørService A/S, Esbjerg Safety Consult A/S, 
Grontmij, HH-Consult A/S, LICengineering A/S, 
Orbicon A/S17 
Netherlands18 Rabobank, ASN bank, Triodos bank 
(managing PGGM and Ampere Equity 
Fund), ING, Typhoon Offshore 
BMO Offshore, Ecofys (6), Grontmij (4), Kema, 
Marin, Deltares, Mecal, TU Delft Wind Energy 
Research Institute DUWind (7), Profin Sustainable 
Energy Solutions BV, OutSmart, Quality in Wind, 
BLIX, Rotation Consultancy 
Germany Commerzbank, KfW incl national 
branches, IPEX-Bank, Siemens Bank, 
Euler Hermes export credit agency, 
RWE Innogy, Deutsche Bank, Unikredit 
Munich, Nord LB, NRW Bank, Helaba, 
HSH Nord Bank AG, Windreich AG 
Germanischer Lloyd Industrial Services GmbH, GL 
Garrad Hassan Deutschland GmbH, OECOS GmbH, 
SGS-International Certification Services GmbH 
(7), Siemens AG 
European European Investment Bank, Société 
Générale S.A. 
 
* The number next to the name indicates the number of contracts they worked on. 
 
For long, the most frequent way of financing the offshore wind farms has been by including 
them in the balance sheet of the utilities (Guillet, 2011). The balance sheets are relatively 
strong but increasingly not sufficient forcing project developers to acquire funds from 
banks and investment companies. Due to the financial crisis and more limited access to 
capital, banks reduced their renewable energy projects funds, hence, a growing number of 
banks are needed for the financing of one wind farm. Despite of that, EWEA (2011c) 
                                                        
17 Morten Holmager, 2012. 
18 http://www.nwea.nl/hollandsgloriewindopzee accessed 27 Apr 2012. 
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reports that the number of banks willing to take offshore wind risk is growing steadily. 
More than 20 organisations have by now (2011) obtained firm credit committee approval 
to take offshore wind risk. Increasingly, Japanese banks working from the UK have become 
involved in financing the European offshore wind activities (Michiel van Heemskerk, 
2012). 
Consultancies involved in the offshore wind field in Denmark, the Netherlands and 
Germany are fewer than in the UK. The large number of UK consultancies might be due to a 
certain consultancy culture (Roberto Lacal-Arántegui, 2012) and a reaction to: the rapidly 
growing offshore wind market, 
the increasing number of new 
projects and the rising demand 
for specialised advice in the 
absence of strong, university-
based and engineering 
knowledge on offshore wind. 
 
There are no specific legal 
organisations solely devoted to 
offshore wind in the analysed countries; each company deals with its own legal issues. For 
the wind farms it is the project developers who are responsible for acquiring all permits 
and assessments, as well as for ensuring legal compliance for the farms’ construction.  
2.2. Networks 
While the presence and the capacities to innovate of various actors are very important for 
the functioning of the TIS, its development is also dependent on the interactions and 
cooperation between the actors. These may take place at various levels: within actors’ 
groups (for example among scientists only), among actors’ groups (e.g. university-industry 
collaborations) or across the entire system. The interactions may also be formalised into 
networks or remain informal bi-, trilateral collaborations. In the following paragraphs we 
identify the most significant collaborations across the entire UK, Danish, Dutch and German 
offshore wind innovation systems: knowledge networks, lobby networks and industrial 
networks. 
2.2.1. Knowledge networks 
Two types of indicators were used to map the knowledge networks: the journal 
publications and the European project collaborations. In this section we also mention 
national collaboration projects in the field of offshore wind. These indicators, however, 
cannot be expected to fully reveal the extent and measurable impact of learning networks 
because, even if learning occurs and even if it stimulates organisational change, it is very 
difficult to attribute the source of knowledge to one particular activity or influence of the 
network. Furthermore, the indicators are only useful to map a codified (explicit) type of 
knowledge that is formalised into scientific publications and projects. Engineering and tacit 
forms of knowledge and networks around such initiatives are very difficult to map in a 
quantitative manner. Our conclusions on informal networks and collaborations are 
therefore supported by the insights from the complementary qualitative research based on 
stakeholders’ survey. 
Great number of consultancies in the UK may 
be a reaction to the rapidly growing offshore 
wind market in the absence of well developed 
university-based and engineering knowledge 
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Journal publications 
Journal publications as archived in the Web of Science from Thomson Scientific in the form 
of the Science Citation Index were 
used in subsection 1.1.2 of this 
report to identify the main national 
knowledge institutes. In this section 
they are used as a source of 
information on the knowledge 
institutes’ R&D collaborations.  
 
Scientific collaborations within the 
offshore wind innovation system, as indicated by co-authored publications, remain 
relatively sparse19 in all four countries. Our data indicate that the average number of 
authors per publication is 1.84; the share of co-authored publications is 46% while the 
share of internationally co-authored papers is 17%. Furthermore, in as far as 
collaborations in codified knowledge production exist; a strong geographical bias is visible. 
Collaborations predominantly take 
place over short distances, with most 
co-authorship within the country. Co-
author networks also suggest that 
university-industry collaborations are 
almost exclusively taking place within 
Europe and are relatively rare. 
On the other hand, however, our qualitative research reveals that in Denmark the informal 
university-industry networks are quite tight. DTU (Risø) has particularly good connection 
with industry through a number of DTU (Risø) start ups; Dong Energy collaborates with 
the Department of Energy Technology at Aalborg University; Vestas sponsors PhDs at 
Aalborg University while Vestas, 
Siemens and LM have offices at 
DTU(Risø) and in Aalborg (Jacobsson 
and Kaltrop, 2012). In the Netherlands 
TU Delft closely cooperates with the 
Dutch subsidiary of Siemens in The 
Hague, Darwind, van Oord, Ballast 
Nedam and Boskalis (Ad van Wijk, 
2012). The range of topics is wide and encompasses such issues as aerodynamics, 
development of wind turbines, construction, and grid development. Also German 
universities are involved in a number of measuring and verification programmes for and in 
close collaboration with the industry. The university in Hannover, for instance, had been a 
world leader in their research into grouted solutions for monopile foundations, long before 
the problems with grout connections surfaced in 2010. The German Fachhochschule in 
Saarbrücken has under the leadership of Prof. Friedrich Klinger developed the Vensys 62, 
Vensys 70/77, and Vensys 90/100 turbine models and many other complete turbine 
designs. Goldwind now owns 70% of Vensys and was in 2011 the world’s second largest 
wind turbine supplier in the world, a success that can, to a large extent, be contributed to 
                                                        
19 Sparse compared to other fields such as biotechnology (Heimeriks and Leydesdorff, 2012). 
University-industry collaborations on journal 
publications are sparse and predominantly 
take place over short distances, with most co-
authorship within the country 
 
The informal industry-university networks 
in Denmark, the Netherlands and Germany 
are tight 
Industry does not publish in fear of their 
strategic knowledge being disseminated 
into the wrong hands 
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the innovative direct drive technology initially developed by Prof. Klinger and his Wind 
Group (Eize de Vries, 2012). 
 
Since these informal collaborations do not leave traces in the form of co-authorships of 
scientific publications, but do provide a strong driver for the offshore wind system 
development; we tend to conclude that the codified knowledge development on offshore 
wind (although very visible in the form of scientific publications), it is only partly relevant 
with regard to progress in offshore wind technologies. 
European research projects 
CORDIS, the Community Research and Development Information Service for Science, 
Research and Development, is the official source of information on the EU framework 
programmes. It offers interactive web facilities that link together researchers, 
policymakers, managers and key players in the field of research. These data permit a 
detailed assessment of the collaborations among organisations within the fields under 
study and their growth over time. 
Figure 10 presents a European collaboration network of organisations aggregated on 
country level. Its form emphasises the centrality of the different nodes/actors in the 
network and shows that the UK, Denmark, the Netherlands and Germany are clear leading 
collaborators in the field in Europe (the four largest circles in the figure). Figure 11 further 
specifies organisations that 
collaborate mostly on European 
projects (Risø, ECN, TU Delft, 
Aalborg University, Vestas, 
University Oldenburg, University 
Edinburgh). The project 
collaborations show, in addition to 
the main organizations involved in 
journal publications, also a large number of companies and research organizations that do 
not publish but do collaborate in projects (Vestas, Dong, Lloyd, Garrad Hassan and 
Partners, etc). 
 
University-industry collaborations on 
European research projects are more 
frequent than on journal publications 
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Figure 10. European collaboration network of organisations aggregated on country 
level. Size adjusted for occurrence in projects, lines lower than 10 removed. The four 
largest collaborators: the UK, Denmark, the Netherlands and Germany circled. 
 
 
 
Figure 11. The core of the CORDIS collaboration network (values lower than 3 
removed, unconnected nodes are not shown) 
These companies are related to safety, regulations and standard issues (Germanischer 
Lloyd), to manufacturers of materials for wind rotors (LM Wind Power A/S) and 
consultancies (GL Garrard Hassan & Partners Ltd). Additionally, public research 
organisations from Germany (Fraunhofer), the UK (former Council for Central Laboratory 
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of the Research Councils) and other European countries play a prominent role in European 
research collaborations. 
 
Except for networks built around European projects and collaborations on scientific papers 
there is also a number of national and regional research networks in the four analysed 
countries such as the UK Carbon Trust’s Offshore Wind Accelerator (OWA, 2012)20 or 
Renewables Innovation Network21, the Dutch Far and Large Offshore Wind (FLOW) project 
(FLOW, 201222) or the German Centre for Wind Energy Research Forwind (Forwind, 
201223). 
2.2.2. Lobby (political) networks 
An important offshore wind lobby network in Europe is the European Wind Energy 
Association (EWEA)24. It actively promotes the utilisation of wind power in Europe, on land 
and offshore. It now has over 700 members from almost 60 countries including: developers 
of wind farms, owners of wind turbines, manufacturers, constructors, research institutes, 
utilities, consultants and O&M service providers. EWEA is thus also an industrial network 
and includes a number of national wind or renewable associations, such as the British 
Wind Energy Association (BWEA now called Renewable UK25), Danish Wind Industry 
Association 26 , Dutch Wind 
Energy Association (NWEA 27 ), 
and German Wind Energy 
Association (BWE28). 
 
In Denmark Megawind is a 
partnership for mega wind 
turbines, established in autumn 
2006 as part of the Danish government’s action plan to promote eco-efficient technology. 
The overall aim of Megawind is to develop a new shared strategy for research and 
innovation in wind power in order to strengthen Denmark’s position as a world leading 
competence centre in wind power. Megawind promotes and initiates a strengthened 
testing, demonstration and research strategy for wind power, and its recommendations are 
a reference for future strategic research in wind power in Denmark. Megawind’s partners 
comprise: Vestas, Siemens, DONG Energy, the Technical University of Denmark, Risø 
National Laboratory, Aalborg University, Balluff ApS, Energinet.dk, and the Danish Energy 
Authority. 
 
In Germany an important political network is the Foundation Offshore Wind Energy29, 
initiated and moderated by the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation 
and Nuclear Safety (BMU) and supported by the establishment of the coastal countries and 
the industries that engage in offshore wind energy. It brings together a great variety of 
                                                        
20 http://www.carbontrust.com/our-clients/o/offshore-wind-accelerator accessed 27 Apr 2012. 
21 http://www.renewables-innovation.co.uk accessed 2 Feb 2012. 
22 http://flow-offshore.nl/images/2011-08/flow_samenvatting.pdf accessed 2 Feb 2012. 
23 www.forwind.de accessed 2 Feb 2012. 
24 http://www.ewea.org accessed 2 Feb 2012. 
25 http://www.bwea.com accessed 27 Apr 2012. 
26 http://www.windpower.org accessed 2 Feb 2012. 
27 http://www.nwea.nl/ accessed 27 Apr 2012. 
28 http://www.wind-energie.de/ accessed 2 Feb 2012. 
29 http://www.offshore-stiftung.com accessed 2 Feb 2012. 
There are a number of European and national 
political networks that lobby for offshore wind 
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actors with a broad offshore wind knowledge base. Its mission is to strengthen the role of 
offshore wind energy in the energy mix in Germany and in Europe and promote their 
development in the interests of environmental and climate protection. 
 
At the European level there is also the European Network of Transmission System 
Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E). The network is an association of Europe's 
transmission system operators (TSOs) for electricity. It is a successor of ETSO, the 
association of European transmission system operators, founded in 1999 in response to 
the emergence of the internal electricity market within the European Union. It contains 42 
TSOs from 34 countries, which now share an interconnected transmission grid in the EU. 
All TSOs from Denmark, the UK, Germany and the Netherlands are part of this network. 
The ENTSO-E is not purely devoted to offshore wind, but it is also of great relevance for 
future offshore wind system expansion, which to a large extent depends on the upgrading 
of the electricity grid. 
2.2.3. Industrial networks 
There are strong national and European industrial networks. EWEA with its national 
associations in the UK, Denmark, the Netherlands and Germany, is the first to name. 
Denmark further hosts Offshore Centre Denmark which is a technical business support 
organisation30. The German Wind Energy Agency (WAB31) is the network of the wind 
energy industry in Germany‘s northwest region and serves as a nationwide contact for the 
offshore wind industry. Since 2002, more than 300 companies and institutes have become 
members of WAB; they cover all areas of the wind energy industry, from research and 
production to installation and maintenance.  
 
A Europe-wide industrial network is the European Technology Platform for Wind Energy 
(TPWind). It is a forum for the crystallisation of policy and technology research and 
development pathways for the wind energy sector, as well as an opportunity for informal 
collaboration among Member States, including those less developed in terms of wind 
energy. TPWind facilitates the development of effective, complementary national and EU 
policy to build markets, as well as a collaborative strategy for technology development. Its 
ultimate aim is to achieve cost 
reductions to ensure the full 
competitiveness of wind power, both 
onshore and offshore. TPWind is 
composed of stakeholders from 
industry, government, civil society, 
R&D organisations, finance 
organisations and the wider power sector, at both member state and EU level. One of the 
main deliverables of the Platform so far, is the European Wind Initiative (EWI), a long-
term, large-scale programme for improving and increasing funding to EU wind energy 
R&D. The EWI, which is rooted in the EU Strategic Energy Technology Plan (SET-Plan) was 
published by the European Commission in 2009 and is now being implemented by EU 
Institutions, member states and TPWind 32. 
                                                        
30 http://www.offshorecenter.dk  accessed 2 Feb 2012. 
31 http://www.wab.net/index.php?&lang=de accessed 2 Feb 2012. 
32 http://www.windplatform.eu/  accessed 2 Feb 2012. 
There are a few strong industrial networks 
in Europe and at national levels 
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2.3. Institutions 
Institutions encompass a set of common habits, routines, expectations and shared concepts 
used by humans in repetitive situations (soft institutions) organised by rules, norms and 
strategies (hard institutions). Institutional set-ups and capacities are determined by their 
spatial, socio-cultural and historical specificity and are different from organisations (such 
as companies, universities, state bodies, etc.). Their presence and ability to function well is 
necessary for a good performance of every innovation system. In the following paragraphs 
we outline the institutions applicable to the offshore wind TIS in the UK, Denmark, the 
Netherlands and Germany. 
2.3.1. Renewable energy target 
The following Table 5 presents an overview of national renewable energy targets per 
country. 
 
Table 5 Renewable energy targets per country 
Country 2020 
Renewable 
energy target 
(Dir. 
2009/28/EC) 
2020 National 
renewable 
electricity 
target 
2020 Projected 
wind offshore 
capacity acc. to 
NREAP 
2020 Projected 
share of offshore 
wind in total 
renew. electricity 
Netherlands 14% 35% (under 
consid.) 
5.2 GW*  38% 
UK 15% 30% 13 GW 38% 
Germany** 18% 30% 10 GW 14% 
Denmark 30%  1.3 GW 26% 
EU27 20%  44 GW  
*The 5.2 GW offshore wind capacity in the Dutch NREAP will most likely not be realized since the current government 
moved its focus from relatively expensive electricity options such as offshore wind to less expensive renewable options 
(at least per kWh of final energy produced) such as biogas and geothermal heat. 
**In its national renewable energy action plan (NREAP), the German government is expecting to achieve a share of 19.6% 
renewable energy in total energy consumption. The overachievement of 1.6% is an expectation based on current 
developments but is not considered a national target. Germany’s federal goal (EEG, 2009) is to achieve 30% of its electric 
power generation from renewable energy sources by 2020. According to the German NREAP renewable electricity as the 
percentage of total electricity production grows from 10.2% in 2005 to 38.6% in 2020. 
2.3.2. Financial incentives offshore wind farms 
There is a great diversity in financial incentives and policy instruments applied in various 
countries (see Table 6).  
 
Table 6. Offshore wind policy instruments in the four analysed countries 
Country Main policy 
instrument 
Other financial 
incentives 
Current support [€/MWh] 
KPMG (2010) 
Netherlands Feed-in premium Fiscal investment deduction 
scheme 
Tender outcome 
UK Renewable 
Obligation 
Certificate(ROC) 
 122.2 €/MWh certificate price for 
2ROCs 
57.9 €/MWh market price for electricity 
incl. LEC=180.1 €/MWh 
Germany Feed-in tariff  Soft loans via KfW 
(government-owned 
35€/MWh basic tariff 
130 €/MWh initial tariff 
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development bank) funding 
programmes 
20 €/MWh sprinter bonus (start up 
until 1 Jan 2016) 
Denmark Feed-in tariff  Tender outcome 
The amount of compensation in the German feed-in tariff follows the principle of cost-
covering compensation and is based on the specific electricity production costs. The plant 
operator receives the feed-in tariff from the grid operator. Compensation payments are 
distributed equally to all operators and passed on to the electricity consumers (i.e. the 
feed-in tariff is not paid from the state budget). The feed-in tariff is granted for 20 years 
and there is no annual cap. 
 
The UK has a Renewable Obligation 
Scheme. It was originally designed to 
give a single level of incentive for all 
renewable electricity. This strategy 
was changed in 2008 after it emerged 
that technologies such as offshore wind 
could not be implemented in 
sufficiently large volumes. From then 
onwards, different technologies were 
given different incentives within the 
scheme. The Renewable Obligation works through electricity suppliers needing to possess 
a certain amount of Renewable Obligation Certificates (ROCs) in order to avoid having to 
pay out buy out penalties in case of underachievement. The penalties are recycled to the 
holders of the ROCs, providing an additional incentive to invest in renewable energy. 
The Dutch feed-in premium 
(Stimuleringsregeling Duurzame 
Energie +, SDE+) is the follow up 
regulation of the SDE. The SDE subsidy 
is either granted based on the first 
come, first served principle, or based on 
(cost-effective) ranking. The latter is 
also referred to as tender procedure. 
The difference between SDE and SDE+, is that in the SDE+ all renewable energy 
technologies need to compete for one (limited) budget, whereas in the SDE each 
technology has got its own (limited) budget. This implies that in the new situation offshore 
wind has to compete with lower cost renewable energy technologies.  
The most important incentive to promote offshore wind in Denmark is a fixed feed-in tariff 
available for wind farms  
2.3.3. Infrastructure policies 
In general, there is a lack of regulatory framework on electricity trade and coordination of 
grid development across Europe. 
 
Grid connection and grid integration of offshore wind is topical in Germany. The recent 
amendment of the German feed-in law was adopted in January 2012.  This amendment 
particularly focuses on the greater system integration of renewable energies. Grid 
connection requirements, grid reconstruction and development as well as the development 
of storage technologies are considered to be important.  
The Dutch SDE subsidy implies that 
offshore wind has to compete with lower 
cost renewable energy technologies 
There are big differences in renewable 
energy targets, regulations and financial 
incentives among the European countries. 
The process of institutional alignment is 
under way but incomplete 
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In the UK, the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) has developed a 
regulatory regime for offshore transmission networks. A key feature of this regime is that 
each new tranche of transmission assets required by offshore generators will be awarded 
through a competitive tender process. Scotland has its own Scottish National Renewables 
Infrastructure Plan, assessing the suitability of Scotland’s port and harbours facilities to 
support offshore renewables. 
 
In the Netherlands, 
institutional aspects of grid 
connection are not fully 
regulated. The current 
division of tasks with 
regards to offshore wind 
dispatching to the grid is 
very unclear. Similarly, the 
transmission connection is 
not regulated by law. 
Contrary to Denmark and Germany where the national Transmission System Operator 
(TSO) is responsible for connecting farms to the grid, in the Netherlands TSO’s are not 
obliged to connect to the grid. It is up to the project developers and companies to arrange 
and pay for the connection, and this lack of regulatory framework is expected to drive up 
grid connection costs for all developers involved. 
 
Regarding possible locations for offshore wind farms, the UK, Denmark and Germany 
explicitly designate preferred areas, not the case in the Netherlands.. Here, several areas 
reserved for other uses are excluded (e.g. excavation, shipping routes, habitat or birds). 
Denmark and the UK carry out strategic environmental assessments for the designated 
areas. In Denmark, all licences are granted by the Danish Energy Agency, which serves as a 
‘One-stop-shop’ for the project developer. 
2.3.4. Expectations and social acceptance 
The 20/20/20 climate targets of EU (EU, 2008) as well as the nationally expressed 
objectives in the National Renewable Energy Action Plans (NREAPs) provide a general 
context for growing expectations 
that offshore wind is potentially 
a huge market. Particularly in 
Germany the decision of the 
government to phase out nuclear 
and include offshore wind as a 
central element in the future 
energy system, fuels the hopes of 
big returns to investments in the 
offshore wind farms. The UK with great wind potential and growing market also has 
growing expectations on its role in the European renewable energy production. On the 
other hand grid issues, high price levels, non-aligned policy targets among the European 
countries, diverse instruments and diverging national regulatory frameworks weaken 
these expectations. That particularly refers to uncertainties about funding of the grid 
connection and overall lack of alignment of the vision on grid improvements. When it 
comes to alternative energy sources and ways to reduce CO2 emissions in the context of 
There is a lack of regulatory framework on 
electricity trade and grid development across 
Europe, but some countries such as Germany and 
UK and the EU as a whole have begun to take steps 
towards harmonised grid integration measures. 
Social acceptance of offshore wind is good but 
the technology has to compete with other 
renewables esp. in the eyes of politicians 
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meeting the climate goals, offshore wind is just one of the options. Therefore is has to face 
competition from other renewables, nuclear energy, CCS and energy savings in gathering 
attention and financial resources. 
 
The social acceptance of offshore wind energy is generally more favourable than onshore. 
The main reasons are the distance to shore and the very small impact of construction on 
the residential communities.  
2.4. Infrastructure 
2.4.1. Knowledge infrastructure 
In this section we map the level of codified and tacit (technological) knowledge 
development. We refer to both types of knowledge as knowledge infrastructure and we use 
two types of indicators to analyse it: patents and journal publications. We complement our 
conclusions on knowledge infrastructure with insights from qualitative research based on 
actors’ interviews. 
Patents 
Patent classifications can provide a good overview of the different classes of technologies 
(and their trajectories) that are 
relevant for the analysed TIS. We 
rely, particularly, on patent data to 
study the development and stock of 
codified (technological) knowledge 
that has potential commercial 
applications. The European Patent 
Organisation (EPO) database offers 
free access to more than 70 million patent documents worldwide, containing information 
about inventions and technical developments from 1836 to date. To study the knowledge 
infrastructure in offshore wind, patents are selected by the keywords offshore wind. The 
following, Table 7, presents an overview of the most important patent classes in offshore 
wind. The large majority of these patents were filed after 2002. 
Table 7. Most important patent classes relevant to offshore wind  
Patent 
code 
Description 
F03D  Wind motors 
B63B  Ships or other waterborne vessels; equipment for shipping 
B01D  Separation 
H02K  Dynamo electric machines 
F03B  Machine or engines for liquids 
E21B  Earth or rock drilling 
E02B  Hydraulic engineering 
F16L  Pipes; joints or fittings for pipes 
B29C  Shaping or joining of plastics 
Most patents are classified in the area F03D (wind motors). The second most prominent set 
of technological invention can be classified as B63B (ships or other waterborne vessels, 
equipment for shipping). In the patent class F03D, the main companies involved in 
Vestas and Siemens are in the top 
worldwide companies patenting in the 
field of wind turbines and vessels 
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manufacturing wind turbines according to the EPO patent analysis are General Electric 
with 453 patents, Vestas with 344 patents and Siemens with 193 patents. The UK and 
Dutch organisations are not dominant players in this respect and no significant patenting 
activity comes from universities in any of the four countries under study. 
Journal publications 
Journal publications are the second indicator of scientific codified knowledge development. 
The screening of journal publications allows not only for the identification of knowledge 
institutes (as in section 2.1.2 – knowledge institutes), but it also helps to trace the 
involvement of other types of actors as co-authors of scientific articles, such as industry or 
consultancies. Our analysis reveals 
two broad trends in this respect.  
Firstly, the number of countries 
publishing on offshore wind energy, 
as well as the number of publications 
in the field, shows a steady increase 
in recent years (see Figure 12). 
Before 1994 hardly any publications 
dealt with offshore wind energy, while now around 350 papers are published yearly. Also, 
the number of (scientific) journals involved in offshore wind energy is expanding rapidly 
from 23 in 1994 to 346 in 2010. 
 
Figure 12. Worldwide growth of publications and countries involved in the codified 
knowledge production on offshore wind, during the period 1994-2010 
 
Secondly, we observe and we showed earlier (in section 2.1.2 - knowledge institutes, Table 
2), that scientific codified knowledge production on offshore wind actually takes place in 
public research organisations. It is not immediately connected to industry as judged by the 
very few companies involved in journal publications. The screening of the most important 
keywords used in the UK, Danish, German and Dutch publications confirms this divergence: 
there is a great deal of scientific information produced on wind forecasts, oceans, climatic 
Codified knowledge production on offshore 
wind takes place in public research 
organisations and is not directly connected 
to industry 
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conditions and how to fit the technology into specific geographical conditions, rather than 
on technology itself (see figure 13). Also our interviewees emphasised, that at events like 
EWEA 2012 there is a rather distinct separation between science and research and resource 
assessment, and other categories like ‘hardware technology’ (Eize de Vries, 2012).  
 
 
Figure 13. The most important keywords in the UK, Danish, Dutch and German 
offshore wind publications33 
 
As far as the analysis of patents and journal publications is useful for the mapping of who is 
involved in codified knowledge production, to what extent and in which areas, these two 
indicators cannot be used to judge the relevance and impact of the knowledge produced. 
From our qualitative research based on interviewing various offshore wind actors we 
know that tacit, engineering knowledge is produced by companies. For example, many 
German firms are world leaders with regard to dedicated R&D, ground-breaking wind 
turbine and other wind technology development, and the implementing of advanced 
offshore wind technology. Germany was the first country in the world to install an offshore 
4.5 MW turbine in 2002: the Enercon E-112. Enercon later decided not to enter the 
offshore market. Another two offshore dedicated wind turbines were installed in 2004: the 
REpower 5M and Multibrid M5000. In 2005 Aerodyn Energiesysteme developed a third 5 
MW turbine for BARD within a record nine-month period, of which two prototypes were 
installed in 2007. Also innovative foundations were developed by REpower and 
Weserwind (jacket), and BARD (tripile) (Eize de Vries, 2012). Because of the tacit character 
of this knowledge, and for reasons of not losing their competitive advantage, companies do 
not codify and do not eagerly share this knowledge, which makes its analysis very difficult. 
 
Based on these findings we conclude 
that innovations in offshore wind are 
incremental, with in-house R&D on 
core technologies in Siemens and 
Vestas. While public research provides 
insight into a wide range of topics for 
                                                        
33 Figure 13 further suggests some specialization patterns among the four analysed countries. For example, ‘turbines’ is popular 
in the UK and Denmark but not in the Netherlands or Germany. The UK has a large number of contributions that are not 
covered by other countries such as ‘renewable energy’ or ‘wind farms’. 
Technological opportunities in offshore 
wind are not fully dependent on major 
scientific work at universities 
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further incremental development, real opportunities to innovate in offshore wind may 
rather come from other applied and more fundamental technological advancements in 
non-codified knowledge, equipment, infrastructures and instrumentation. Possibly, non-
codified sources of knowledge in terms of suppliers or users may play a crucial role.  
2.4.2. Physical infrastructure  
The presence and sufficient capacity of the physical infrastructure is very important for the 
development and functioning of every innovation system. Its lack or malfunction may have 
serious consequences for the functioning of the TIS. In this subsection we identify and 
analyse the UK, Danish, Dutch and German offshore wind infrastructure: wind turbines, 
wind farms, cables, vessels, foundations, grid and harbours. 
Wind turbines 
As much as wind turbine technology is well developed for onshore applications, offshore 
wind technology is still a young industry and seen by many companies as risky. For a 
number of years there was a 
shortage of control systems for 
wind turbines, and of other key 
components such as gearboxes 
and transformers. Also strong 
demand for cheaper and ‘less 
risky’ onshore projects made 
manufacturers stay away from 
offshore wind power (EWEA, 
2011a). Today, experienced 
suppliers, Vestas, Siemens and 
REpower, as well as BARD and Areva Wind, successfully operate a more mature series of 
wind turbine models up to 6.15 MW offshore, with new installations up to 7 MW+ in 
development. There is also a growing range of offshore market newcomers (see section 
2.1.4 – industrial actors) who developed, or are developing, new wind turbines of around 5 
– 8 MW, characterised by a wide choice in different drive systems and other dedicated 
design solutions. AMSC is an example of a new entrant that is developing a 10 MW turbine 
with a high temperature superconductor (HTS) generator; meanwhile a UK company is 
planning an unusual 10 MW vertical axis turbine called Aerogenerator X. Even though 
several of the first-generation 3.6 – 5 MW turbines were already offshore-dedicated 
designs, second and third-generation turbines will increasingly benefit from experience 
and fresh know-how for further adaptation to harsh offshore conditions (Eize de Vries, 
2012). EWEA (2011a) expects 4-12 new wind turbine models to reach some level of 
market readiness in the next decade, with overall supply meeting and even exceeding the 
demand in Europe, with potential for export. 
Wind farms 
The Table 8 presents a list of the top offshore wind farms that are currently operational, 
rated by capacity.  
 
 
There are large technical challenges for the 
design of turbines and tests are underway 
with 4-12 new turbines expected to enter the 
market later this decade, still further R&D is 
needed to make the technology cost-effective 
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Table 8. Top operational offshore wind farms in the world, according to capacity 
(source: JRC, 2012) 
Wind farm Capacit
y (MW) 
Country Manufactur
er 
No. Turbine 
model 
Year 
Greater Gabbard 382* UK Siemens 106 SWT-3.6-107 2011 
Walney I & II 367 UK Siemens 102 SWT-3.6-107 2012 
Thanet 300 UK Vestas 100 V90-3.0 MW 2010 
Horns Rev 2 209 DK Siemens 91 SWT-2.3-93 2009 
Rodsand II 207 DK Siemens 90 SWT-2.3-93 2010 
Chenjiagang Xiangshui 
Intertidal 
201 CN Dongfang 134 FD77-1500 2010 
Robin Rigg 180 UK Vestas 60 V90-3.0 MW 2010 
Gunfleet Sand 173 UK Siemens 48 SWT-3.6-107 2010 
Rodsand 1 - Nysted 166 DK Siemens 72 SWT-2.3-93 2003 
Belwind (Bligh Bank) 165 BE Vestas 55 V90-3.0 MW 2010 
Horns Rev 1 160 DK Vestas 80 V80-2.0 MW 2002 
Ormonde 152 UK REpower 30 REpower 5M 2011 
Princess Amalia (Q7) 120 NL Vestas 60 V80-2.0 MW 2008 
Lillgrund 110 SE Siemens 48 SWT-2.3-93 2007 
Egmond aan Zee (OWEZ) 108 NL Vestas 36 V90-3.0 MW 2006 
Dong Hai Bridge 1 102 CN Sinovel 34 SL3000/90 2010 
Jiangsu Rudong Offshore/ 
Intertidal Demonstration 
99 CN Sinovel & 
Siemens 
38 SL3000 & 
SWT-2.3-101 
2011 
Inner Dowsing 97 UK Siemens 27 SWT-3.6-107 2009 
Lynn 97 UK Siemens 27 SWT-3.6-107 2009 
* Of a total of 504 MW (140 turbines), 106 turbines (382 MW had produced power by 31.12.2011, but the construction 
continues (Roberto Lacal-Arantegui, 2012). 
 
In addition to wind farms already in operation a number of new ones are either planned or 
consented. The installed capacity in EU in 2011 was 3.8 GW, out of which the UK accounted 
for 55% (2.1 GW), Denmark 23% (0.9 GW), Germany 5% (0.2 GW) and the Netherlands 6% 
(0.2 GW). Nine offshore projects were under construction in 2011 with the total capacity of 
2.3 GW. Furthermore, preparatory work started in 2011 on nine other projects of which 
seven are in Germany (2.3 GW) and two in the UK (0.6 GW). A further 18 GW has been 
consented of which 5% is in the UK, 12% in the Netherlands, 45% in Germany and none in 
Denmark. In the case of the Netherlands, it must be noted that only part of the consented 
capacity has been granted subsidy for the operation; the ones without subsidy will most 
likely not be realized. The following figure (Figure 14) shows the installed, consented and 
planned capacity per country in 2011.  
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Figure 14. The amount of MW in different development stages per country in 2011 
EWEA (2011d) having analysed all planned wind farms concluded that, in general, sites for 
new wind farms are bigger in number and power-rating, and moving further from shore 
into deep water, posing additional logistical and technological challenges. There is also a 
tendency to connect wind farms with each other into hubs, and then to the grid, rather than 
connecting separate wind farms to the grid for economic and time reasons. 
Cables 
For an offshore wind farm to operate to its fullest efficiency/capacity, different types of 
cables are necessary. These are specific subsea cables: export cables and inter-array cables. 
Both types are high voltage cables (in either AC or DC electrical power transmission 
applications). As we showed earlier (section 2.1.4 Industrial actors) there is a limited range 
of suppliers for high-voltage (HV) 
subsea cables due to high 
investment costs and long lead 
times for bringing new cable 
capacity online (3 years). Also the 
demand for this type of cable 
begins slowly to outpace the 
manufacturing capacity. If the 
offshore wind sector continues to expand at the current rate, availability of cables may 
become a serious constraint (EWEA, 2011a). 
Foundations (substructures) 
Substructure supply and installation for offshore wind farms represent about 20-30% of 
capital costs. There are also (perceived) low technical barriers for entry, which together 
present major opportunities for national manufacturing in the offshore wind countries of 
Europe, but past experiences have not been uniformly positive. EWEA (2011a) argues that 
it is, therefore, not necessary for a country to be manufacturing turbines in order to 
develop a strong offshore wind industry. 
If the offshore wind sector expands to meet 
the target, availability of cables may 
become a serious constraint 
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There are different types of 
foundations, depending on the water 
depth, seabed and turbine 
characteristics, but most common are: 
monopile, gravity based structure 
(GBS) and steel three-dimensional structures (jackets, tripods, tripiles). Most of the 
operating wind farms in Europe do not exceed 25 m water depth and therefore use 
monopiles. GBS has been applied in several more shallow-water wind farms and in the first 
phase of Thornton Bank (6 x 5 MW) (Eize de Vries, 2012). Also countries such as the UK 
and the Netherlands own many sites that offer geographically favourable conditions for the 
use of monopiles, their use however depends on the wind turbine size and power rating. 
Germany’s deep-water North Sea sites are generally not suitable for the use of monopiles; 
its potential new sites are at a greater distance to shore and at greater depth (KPMG, 2010). 
In the case of wind farms being placed further from shore into deeper water, different 
types of floating structures could become feasible, but they are currently not being 
produced by any of the analysed countries. 
Vessels 
Currently 6 different types of vessels are necessary to install and operate a wind farm. 
Vessels are needed, for example, to transport components and personnel, to install the 
substructure, turbines and substations as well as to lay cables. EWEA (2011a) expects that 
‘until 2020 the demand for vessels will grow to around 27 per site. Jack-up vessels remain 
the industry workhorses as vessel specialisation increases. The industry is seeing 
increased specialisation of vessels for offshore wind generally, and for the specific tasks 
performed on an offshore wind site. Nevertheless, jack-up designs are expected to continue 
dominating vital installation procedures and particularly turbine installation. Developers 
are looking at strategic investments to secure vessels. However, in the near term, supply 
constraints are decreasing, which may stem this trend. The vessel supply chain outlook is 
strong through to 2015 with several new-builds, increased levels of competition, and 
supply likely to meet demand. Through the latter half of the decade increasing pressure 
may return if further investments are 
not made’.  
Harbours 
Harbours are of vital importance to the 
offshore wind industry but they need 
to be specifically adapted (deep water 
quays, large storage facilitates, space 
for manoeuvre) to be able to serve the 
offshore wind industry. Two types of ports are important for offshore wind. First type 
includes manufacturing ports where the manufacturing facility is located close to, or at the 
port, and ready components/assemblies are exported directly to the offshore site. The 
second type are mobilisation ports where the components and turbines are received ready 
and transported to either the installation vessels directly or the feeder vessels which take 
them on the offshore site (EWEA, 2011a). 
Many of the UK, Danish, Dutch and German harbours have direct access to the North Sea 
and the Baltic Sea. They also retain significant experience and infrastructure developed for 
Availability of substructures and vessels is 
good in Europe but requires constant 
innovation 
Many of the Dutch, Danish, German and UK 
harbours are particularly suitable for 
large logistical offshore wind operations. 
Still adjustments are necessary 
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operating the offshore gas and oil industry. This makes them particularly suitable for large 
logistical operations related to the installation of wind farms.  
Examples of such harbours in the four analysed countries are presented in Table 9 and are 
marked as having ‘offshore wind experience’. The remaining harbours are ‘potential sites 
only’. 
Table 9. The current harbour infrastructure in the four analysed countries (based on 
EWEA, 2011a selection) 
Country Harbour Remarks 
Netherlands Eemshaven 
IJmuiden 
Vlissingen 
Den Helder 
Offshore wind experience 
Offshore wind experience 
Offshore wind experience 
Potential only 
UK Barrow 
Cape Firth 
Dundee 
Great Yarmouth 
Hartlepool and tees 
Humber 
Hunterstone 
Medway 
Methil 
Milford H 
Montrose 
Mostyn 
Newheaven 
Peterhead 
Portland  
Ramsgate 
Southampton  
Swansea 
Tyneside 
Offshore wind experience 
Potential only 
Potential only 
Offshore wind experience 
Offshore wind experience 
Offshore wind experience 
Potential only 
Potential only 
Offshore wind experience 
Potential only 
Potential only 
Offshore wind experience 
Potential only 
Potential only 
Potential only 
Offshore wind experience 
Potential only 
Potential only  
Potential only 
Germany Bremerhaven 
Cuxhaven 
Emden 
Lubmin 
Rostock 
Sassnitz 
Wismar 
Offshore wind experience 
Offshore wind experience 
Offshore wind experience 
Offshore wind experience 
Offshore wind experience 
Offshore wind experience 
Potential only 
Denmark Aalborg 
Aarhus 
Copenhagen 
Esbjerg 
Frederikshaven 
Nyborg 
Offshore wind experience 
Offshore wind experience 
Potential only 
Offshore wind experience 
Offshore wind experience 
Offshore wind experience 
For example, Esbjerg (DK) is considered by one of the leading energy business analysts in 
the world, Douglas-Westwood, as a European leader when it comes to the supply chain for 
offshore energy. The municipality of Esbjerg, with investments of billions of kroner in 
roads, railroads, land used for business purposes, education and research, plans to take 
advantage of the huge growth potential in offshore energy and bioenergy systems34.  
                                                        
34 http://www.esbjergkommune.dk/en-gb/work/energymetropolis.aspx accessed 30 Dec 2011. 
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The Dutch Eemshaven is also 
strategically located right below the 
German continental shelf and already 
serves as a logistical and supply 
harbour for many offshore wind 
projects (Bard 1, Alpha Ventus). Since 
many new wind turbines are to be built in the North Sea in the years to come, Eemshaven is 
expected to develop into the logistics hub of the Netherlands’ offshore wind industry. To 
meet the requirements of an offshore wind facility, Groningen Seaports is investing about 
€25m in 700 metres of new heavy-duty quay facilities at Eemshaven and an extension of 
Beatrixhaven by 500 metres. The work is scheduled for completion in 201335.  
The UK has the greatest potential wind energy resource out of all the analysed countries 
(EEA, 2009), i.e. an extensive coastline, and thus good conditions for offshore wind farm 
development. However out of the many UK harbours mentioned in the Table 9 only a few 
have offshore wind experience: Barrow, Yarmouth, Humber, Methil, Mostyn and Ramsgate. 
To support the establishment of offshore wind manufacturing at port sites in the UK, the  
government has made up to £60m available (Department of Energy and Climate Change, 
2011)36. The Crown Estate also announced it would work with interested ports and 
manufacturers to realise the potential of their sites. 
In Germany, to meet the offshore wind challenges, there is a drive towards cluster building 
for offshore wind manufacturing in closely located ports (e.g. German cluster 
Bremenhaven, Cuxhaven, Emden). These initiatives are the result of the cooperation 
between public and private sectors (EWEA, 2011a). 
 
In general, offshore wind energy offers a significant opportunity for harbours to offset the 
downturn hitting traditional activities. These harbours, however, still need to develop a 
capacity dedicated to accommodating  the establishment of coastal manufacturing and 
assembly facilitates, as well as, to avoid transport constraints (roads, trucks) related to the 
increased size of wind turbines (EWEA, 2011a). 
Grid 
Europe's electricity grids were originally built to handle large centralized (fossil fuel) 
power plants, rather than great amounts of distributed renewable generation, such as that 
produced by offshore wind farms. The grid therefore (stability and capacity wise) is not 
always ready to accept rising amounts of offshore wind energy, and face the challenges 
related to increased electrification as 
more renewables come online. The 
electricity grid is also largely designed 
around national borders (Wind 
directions, 2012). Because there is no 
single market for electricity but 
multiple national markets, the amount 
of traded electricity is very low. Grid 
                                                        
35 http://www.groningen-seaports.com/Business/Offshorewindindustrie/tabid/2133/language/en-US/Default.aspx accessed 30 
Dec 2011. 
36 http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/meeting_energy/wind/offshore/business_dev/business_dev.aspx accessed 30 Dec 
2011. 
There is an emergence of strong offshore 
wind clusters around many European 
offshore harbours 
Early initiatives are under way at national 
and European level to enhance the 
capacity and access to the grid 
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development is therefore not only a technical issue but also an institutional problem. 
At EU level plans for grid 
development have already started. 
At the end of 2011, the European 
Commission has created an 
innovation grant of €3m towards 
the development of a programme to 
warrant European grid security in 
the future. Currently there are about 
ten projects being set up (DG-ENER, 
2012). Together with a number of 
TSOs and universities involved, the Dutch/German national Transmission System Operator 
TenneT was made responsible for this project. The programme is aimed at integrating a 
growing share of sustainable electricity into the grid and at managing the increasing cross-
border electricity flows (Tennet, 201137). TenneT BV is Europe’s first cross-border 
electricity transmission operator. A significant section of TenneT’s high-voltage grid 
borders onto the North Sea in both the Netherlands and Germany. Two connections for 
offshore wind farms have already been completed in the German section of the North Sea 
and work is underway on three more wind farms. In addition, the Dutch electricity grid is 
linked to Norway by means of an undersea cable link (NorNed) and to the United Kingdom 
(BritNed cable). There are also plans for new undersea cables to Norway (NorNed2 and 
NORD.LINK) and Denmark (COBRA cable). These interconnections will play an important 
part in the further development and integration of wind energy and the promotion of 
market integration. 
 
In the UK, the Crown Estate has initiated a dedicated Transmission Programme to play a 
more effective and proactive role in the delivery of the necessary offshore infrastructures. 
The immediate challenges the Crown Estate aims to address in this programme are: (i) 
sustainable use of seabed and foreshore for cable corridors to cope with intensified cable 
laying activities; (ii) regulatory improvement to enable offshore energy projects to secure 
connections in a timely, reliable and cost efficient way; (iii) development of a transmission 
network that will contribute to the aim of reducing cost and risks of delivering offshore 
renewable; also delivery of offshore transmission to avoid unnecessary consenting delays 
and uncoordinated development; and (iv) mitigation of a potential bottleneck in supply of 
offshore export power cabling. In addition, the Crown Estate is contributing to the current 
review and reform on transmission charging and electricity markets. To prepare for 
potential electricity export from renewable energy sources to Europe, post 2025, the 
Crown Estate plans to investigate the development of a pan-EU offshore grid to underpin 
future leasing rounds and renewable energy export. This will be in conjunction with the 
North Seas Countries’ Offshore Grid Initiative confirmed by the ten North Sea countries and 
the EU in December 2010’ (The Crown Estate, 2011)38. 
 
Denmark is the world leader in integrating renewable and distributed energy sources into 
electric power systems. The country currently has about 25% wind power penetration into 
the system, and their conventional generation is highly distributed with combined heat and 
power plants dispersed throughout the landscape. In order to achieve an even greater wind 
                                                        
37 www.tennet.org, accessed 30 Dec 2011. 
38 http://www.thecrownestate.co.uk/media/211168/uk_offshore_wind_report_2011.pdf accessed 12 Apr 2012. 
Europe’s electricity grid is a sum of 
national grids and multiple markets. The 
amount of traded electricity is very low. 
Bigger amounts of renewable electricity 
are challenging for the grid 
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penetration and glean the most benefit from the distributed power system, Energinet.dk, 
the Danish TSO Company, who is the owner and operator of the high-voltage power system 
in Denmark, is working on developing an innovative grid management technology. This 
technology will optimise the performance of the grid by maximising the contribution from 
renewables and enhancing the utilization of the distributed combined heat and power 
plants. In addition, this technology will ensure grid stability and security with the 
capability to segment portions of the network into virtual power plants, aggregate 
resources to provide ancillary services, and provide the ability to more easily restore 
power in the event of network breakdown.39 
 
At a European level a European Network of Transmission System Operators ENTSO –E was 
established that brings six TSO s together in order to develop a 10 year plan for the grid. 
2.4.3. Financial infrastructure 
Alongside the physical and knowledge infrastructure, availability of funds for installation of 
wind farms is a critical factor that influences the operation of the innovation systems. In 
the following table (Table 10) we show the overview of capital costs of fully commissioned 
wind farms in the UK, Denmark, the Netherlands and Germany. 
 
Table 10. Capital costs of fully commissioned farms in the UK, Denmark, the 
Netherlands and Germany. Conversion rates 26 April 201240. 
Country Farm name Project Cost (million EUR) 
Blyth 4.88 
North Hoyle 97.60 
Scroby Sands 92.16 
Kentish Flats 128.10 
Barrow 170.19 
Burbo Bank 220.82 
Lynn 366.00 
Beatrice Demonstration 42.70 
Inner Dowsing 366.00 
Robin Rigg 483.12 
Thanet 1098.00 
Gunfleet Sands I + II 512.40 
UK  
 
Rhyl Flats 241.56 
Vindeby 8.80 
Tunø Knob 11.95 
Middelgrunden 47.00 
Samsø 30.00 
Horns Rev 1 272.00 
Rønland 25.00 
Nysted 200.00 
Frederikshavn 1344.10 
Horns Rev 2 470.00 
Rødsand 2 400.00 
Sprogø 72.00 
Avedøre Holme 24.82 
Denmark 
 
Poseidon n/a 
                                                        
39 http://www.spirae.com/vision-reality.php accessed 12 Apr 2012. 
40 www.xe.com. 
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Lely 5.37 
Irene Vorrink 23.88 
Prinses Amalia windpark 350.00 
The Netherlands 
 
Egmond aan Zee 200.00 
ENOVA Offshore Project Ems Emden n/a 
Breitling n/a 
Alpha Ventus 250.00 
Hooksiel n/a 
Germany 
 
EnBW Baltic 1 200.00 
Next to fully commissioned projects, there is a set of consented and planned wind farms for 
which the capital costs are not yet fully known. It is therefore difficult to assess this 
infrastructural element of the innovation systems. The qualitative research based on 
actors’ interviews suggests that the availability of funds for capital costs is problematic and 
increasing number of actors (utilities and banks predominantly) need to be involved to 
make one project bankable. 
3. Functional analysis 
The structural analysis, we performed in the previous section (Section 2), gives a good 
overview of the innovation systems (actors, networks, institutions and infrastructure). 
Often, however, different innovation systems have similar components, but they function in 
an entirely different way. Therefore, next to analysing the structure, it is also important to 
assess how particular innovation systems function, in other words - what the actors do and 
whether this is sufficient to develop successful innovations. Analysis of these processes 
allows us to address the performance of an innovation system and complement the insights 
from the structural analysis. To appraise this performance a set of evaluation criteria is 
used that, in the literature, have been labelled as ‘functions of innovation systems’. The 
‘functions’ state how an innovation system performs at a specific point in time and they 
include: entrepreneurial activities (F1), knowledge development (F2), knowledge exchange 
(F3), guidance of the search (F4), market formation (F5), resources mobilization (F6) and 
legitimacy creation (F7). 
 
In this section we evaluate the functioning of the UK, Danish, Dutch and German offshore 
wind innovation systems at the end of 2011. Since innovation does not recognise optimum 
it is impossible to judge whether there is enough of it. Our discussion on the sufficiency of 
innovative activity in the areas defined by the functions is, therefore, based on the 
qualitative evaluation of the capacity of the four analysed systems to grow further and 
accelerate, and not on quantitative assessment in the context of reaching the European and 
national targets. We discuss each function in all four countries to compare the various 
innovation systems and draw, wherever possible, general conclusions for the European 
offshore wind TIS. The discussion is ordered along a set of diagnostic questions that help 
asses each function. The section closes with a graphical overview of the functional 
dynamics in each country. A 5-tier scale of absent-weak-moderate-strong-excellent is used 
to demonstrate the strength or weakness of each function. 
 
The functioning of the innovation systems is assessed based on information from several 
sources: over 30 stakeholder’s interviews; 10 reviews of the draft report; events reported 
on in the Windpower Monthly magazine in 2011, as well as data from a number of 
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industrial and scientific publications and web pages of offshore companies, their products 
and activities. During the interviews experts and stakeholders from the UK, Denmark, the 
Netherlands and Germany were asked to express their views on the functioning of the 
national TISs along with a set of diagnostic questions (see Annex 1).  
3.1. Entrepreneurial experimentation (F1) 
No innovation system can exist without entrepreneurs. Their role is to turn knowledge into 
concrete action that generates new business opportunities and value to their societies. 
Entrepreneurs can be new entrants seeking business opportunities or incumbent 
companies diversifying their activities to realise new business prospects. To evaluate the 
entrepreneurial experimentation in the four analysed countries we looked at the number 
and the type of actors involved in experimentation (incumbent vs. start ups) as well as the 
number and type of activities of these actors, such as involvement in national versus 
international projects, specialization along the value chain or focus on large scale 
production. 
3.1.1. Are there sufficient and suitable types of actors contributing to 
entrepreneurial experimentation? 
Our structural analysis shows (particularly section 2.1.4) that larger incumbent companies 
dominate the value chains of the four analysed countries (Figures 1-4). Analysis of their 
entrepreneurial activity (see Box 1 for selected examples) further shows that the 
incumbents also contribute most to the entrepreneurial activities. In the Netherlands these 
are established offshore construction firms who diversified their activities to offshore wind 
(such as Sif, Smulders, Ballast Nedam, Van Oord, etc.), in Denmark and Germany wind 
turbine manufacturers (Vestas and Siemens; REpower and Multibrid) are leading 
entrepreneurs on a European scale. In the UK large foreign multinational utility companies, 
such as E-on, RWE, Vattenfall and Dong Energy, dominate as owners and operators of the 
wind farms. Incumbents, who diversify their business portfolio, accelerate the system 
development, are less vulnerable to changing political winds in the country, and are more 
stable financially. Their presence in the analysed value chains is also beneficial for the 
offshore wind system at a European level. This is because they have the capacity to exercise 
a larger impact on the wind power lobby and, for instance, contribute to the mobilization of 
complementary resources for, among others, grid improvements. In the UK the dominance 
of utilities as owners and operators however may, according to Markard and Petersen 
(2010), also have some negative bearings, mainly on social acceptance of the technology 
applied in projects, which is partially based on the access to public finance by smaller 
parties. If the funds begin to be streamlined to the large utilities this may raise issues with 
the legitimacy of the system. Markard and Petersen (2010) also suggest that this particular 
ownership structure may further alter the market concentration on the demand side, as 
bigger companies negotiate more powerfully with equipment manufacturers. 
 
On the other hand, despite the current visible dominance of Vestas and Siemens in wind 
turbine manufacturing, there is an increased number of new entrants in various countries 
all working on new turbine models. New entrants are critical for entrepreneurial activities 
and are a sign of the systems’ dynamic development. Together with incumbents the new 
entrants create a good balance, to the extent that EWEA estimates that over the next 
decade the supply of wind turbines has the chance to overtake the demand (EWEA, 2011a). 
In the area of cables there are very few new entrants, and some in the area of installation 
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vessels. If that trend persists it may imply that the existing cables and vessel companies 
will have to increase their overall research, product development and manufacturing 
volume efforts, in order to meet the growing demand. 
3.1.2. Are the amount and type of activities of the actors sufficient? 
The structural analysis as well as the analysis of the functional pattern based on 
Windpower Monthly reveal that there is a visible division of labour and specialisation 
between the countries along the value chain; hence the entrepreneurial activities of the 
analysed countries take place in various phases of the chain. The Dutch entrepreneurial 
activities are mostly in the construction phase with focus on foundations and substations, 
Danish in wind turbine manufacturing and construction focused on heavy vessels, while 
the UK in wind turbine and subsea cables installations (see also Figure 9 earlier). Germany 
is active in many areas ranging from design and production of wind turbines, foundations, 
towers, vessels and a wide range of components. 
 
Data also suggest that wind farms are mostly owned and managed by national actors but 
constructed by a number of international companies. Particularly, the UK innovation 
system is more open to foreign actors compared to the other three. That means that even 
though the UK has a great number of new wind farm projects, it is the foreign industry that 
benefits most. At the same time, we also observe that Dutch (mainly construction) 
companies, due to poor domestic market conditions, are the most internationally oriented. 
What does it mean for the functioning of the offshore wind innovation systems? Even 
though no TIS is confined to national borders, still national factors (such as access to funds, 
permitting procedures) significantly contribute to the success of a TIS. This explains why 
often TISs are analysed in the context of a specific country. From the European perspective 
the specialisation along the value chain is not problematic, because the four countries seem 
to complement each other rather well. Similarly, the limited number of the UK actors in the 
UK value chain is not problematic either as long as foreign companies do the job. However, 
when looking from the national perspective, the specialisation may suggest an 
underdeveloped value chain with a limited number of key actors in specific phases of the 
value chain. This may further result in the loss of legitimacy and political support at the 
national level, in case when national incentives for offshore wind primarily lead to the 
building up of the offshore wind industry abroad. The rather complete European offshore 
wind TIS may then turn out to be not sustainable. 
 
In the situation where countries, the UK in particular, decide to protect their national 
markets and increase the number of domestic actors in the value chain – this would mean 
the loss of an important market and source of revenue for international constructors. This 
would specifically put very welcome and essential pressure on the Dutch government to 
develop a domestic market, and to avoid erosion of its own offshore wind industry that 
currently earns its bread abroad. 
3.1.3. How does the function score? 
In view of the above findings and despite the fact that interviewees judged this function 
relatively highly, we suggest that the function entrepreneurial activity might become 
problematic and hamper further development of the TIS through the interlinked issue. This 
is especially the case when legitimacy in the UK is reduced (as a result of money flowing 
abroad). This situation would then have serious impacts on entrepreneurial activity in all 
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countries. Because of a lack of a strong home market, especially in the Netherlands and 
Denmark, the offshore wind industry in these countries (and the UK itself of course) would 
be most affected. German entrepreneurial activity (except for Siemens) would probably be 
less strongly affected. We therefore evaluate the function F1 entrepreneurial activities at 
the level of: moderate (3) in the UK, excellent (5) in Germany; and (conditionally) strong 
(4) in the Netherlands41 and Denmark. It must also be emphasised that even though these 
are quite high scores still there are more entrepreneurial experiments needed in all four 
countries to reduce the risks and increase experience in the field. 
 
                                                        
41 This score is to acknowledge the Dutch entrepreneurial activities abroad in the absence of strong domestic market. The 
function Market formation is assessed in the later part of this report. 
Box 1. Selected examples of the UK, Danish, Dutch and German entrepreneurial activities in 2011 
• Consortium of Strukton and Hollandia worked on foundation of German Dan Tysk offshore wind project 
(NL)  
• Van Oord invested in new vessel for installing offshore wind turbines (NL) 
• The Dutch foundation manufacturer Smulders reached the level of 60% of all offshore wind foundations 
currently constructed in the North Sea (NL);  
• Royal Doeksen invested 4 million in two maintenance vessels while Abis shipping builds new vessels for 
transporting turbines (NL) 
• Royal Haskoning, IHC Merwede, Ballast Nedam and Van Oord focused on the prospective French market. 
Only Smit Marine contracting resigned from investment in new vessels for cables because of uncertainty 
of governmental policies (NL) 
• REpower started the series manufacture of its latest 6.15MW 6M model (DE) 
• BARD installed two 6.5MW prototypes fitted with an innovative Winergy gearbox design (DE) 
• Siemens launched a version of its 6MW offshore turbine with a 154-metre rotor, and installed the first 
6MW prototype (DE) 
• Siemens received a 288MW order from E-on for an offshore wind farm in the North Sea (DE) 
• Siemens increased its order levels in 2011, in a year that looks likely to have been one of steady growth 
for many firms in the industry(DE) 
• Siemens confirmed it plans to install a grid connection in the North Sea for the 864MW SylWin offshore 
wind farm cluster for the Dutch-German transmission grid operator TenneT (DE) 
• Siemens Energy has begun work on its recently won contract to build a transmission link for a 400MW 
offshore wind farm in the North Sea -in a joint venture with Italian cabling firm Prysmian (DE) 
• German offshore wind developer Windreich signed a deal with Areva for 42 5MW offshore wind turbines 
for the Deutsche Bucht offshore wind farm (DE) 
• Eneco handed Vestas a 129MW supply deal for a wind project off the Dutch coast (DK) 
• Vestas got a contract for a supply of wind turbines to developer PNE Wind for a 252MW offshore project 
in Germany (DK) 
• Vestas unveiled plans for next-generation 7 MW offshore wind turbines (DK) 
• Dong Energy signed a long-term framework agreement for the supply of foundations to its offshore wind 
farms with Danish manufacturer Bladt Industries (DK) 
• Dong Energy confirmed it plans to build the 320 MW Borkum Riffgrund 1 wind farm off the German coast 
(DK) 
• Rolls Royce supplied water jets for six new wind farm support vessels in separate orders for the UK and 
Australian shipbuilders (UK) 
• The UK government approved Dong Energy's plans to develop the 245 MW Westermost Rough wind 
farm off the N-E coast of England (UK) 
• Scottish and Southern Energy (SSE) halted plans to build the 378 MW Kintyre offshore wind farm off the 
Scottish coast for a variety of reasons including a lack of wind resource (UK) 
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3.2. Knowledge development (F2) 
New knowledge and mechanisms of learning are prerequisites of every innovation system. 
There are different types of knowledge (codified, tacit/technological) and various sources 
of new knowledge (R&D, learning by doing, learning by searching, etc.). To evaluate this 
function in the four analysed countries we studied the number and the type of actors 
involved in the knowledge development (knowledge institutes vs. industrial parties), as 
well as the type of knowledge developed (number of patents, publications, specialization 
along the value chain, alignment of produced knowledge with needs, etc). 
3.2.1. Are there enough actors involved in knowledge development and are they 
suitable? 
As demonstrated in sections 2.1.2 (Knowledge institutes) there are a growing number of 
knowledge institutes involved in research on offshore wind in all four analysed countries. 
While in the UK and Germany the scientific knowledge production is rather spread out over 
a great number of organisations, in Denmark and the Netherlands it is concentrated in a 
small number of institutes. With regards to their competencies as judged by their track 
record of published articles, the Danish University Alborg and DTU and the Dutch TU Delft 
rank highest in terms of number of journal publications. These organisations are therefore 
known worldwide for their scientific expertise on offshore wind energy. In Germany, IWES 
and Forwind (Oldenburg, Bremen and Hannover) are the research and education base of 
the country, whereas the UK works on catching up by involving growing number of 
universities in the offshore wind research and publication process. 
 
The structural analysis (section 2.4.1 knowledge infrastructure), the analysis of functional 
pattern (see Box 2 for examples), as well as our qualitative research, further reveal that 
while public research provides insight42 into a wide range of topics, such as models of wind 
turbulence, deep sea geology, turbine efficiency and oceanic wind patterns; it is the 
industrial players that develop the bulk of the needed technological knowledge. This 
knowledge actually drives the system development. The patent pattern shows greatest 
activity in the categories of vessels and wind motor by Vestas and Siemens, but there are 
also many new entrants in these areas who experiment with new designs and in so doing 
make the field very dynamic and competitive. 
 
In line with the opinion of our interviewees, we can therefore conclude that there are 
enough competent actors that can develop both codified as well as tacit types of knowledge 
in all four analysed countries. Points of attention from the perspective of national TIS’s are 
the following: firstly, the differences in concentration of codified knowledge production 
may imply for the UK and Germany the possible risk of insufficient focus and critical mass 
because of the distribution of resources in knowledge development. In Denmark and the 
Netherlands, on the other hand, there might exist the likelihood of insufficient diversity 
and variety in scientific knowledge production. As much as the dispersed model is useful 
for the training of future engineers all over the country, it does not seem sufficient for the 
provision of advanced education that is closely linked with research (Staffan Jacobsson, 
2012). A concentrated model may lead knowledge development in the field more 
efficiently, and make it more visible and accessible to companies who want to cooperate. A 
                                                        
42 Codified knowledge very well visible in the form of scientific publications. 
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minimal amount of focus and critical mass is also necessary to contribute to and compete 
in the international knowledge development. 
 
Secondly, because of the dominance of the tacit, technological dimension of knowledge in 
innovative activities and the complexity of the technological trajectory, there may be a 
tendency for a geographical concentration of innovation. The particular dominance of 
multinationals such as Vestas and Siemens in the production of technological knowledge 
on wind turbines is very important for the system development and also as a European 
counter-balance for competition with Asia or the US. However, such dominance is not 
without risks, especially when taking a European or national perspective. One of these 
risks is the likelihood of a monopoly and all its implications, such as high prices and high 
entry barriers for newcomers. Fortunately, according to the 2011 data (e.g. EWEA, 2011a) 
this risk is balanced by the presence of a number of new entrants in that area. Their 
emergence is necessary to create variety in the number of technological solutions. The 
offshore wind market is too immature to just rely on a few large players. 
3.2.2. Is the knowledge sufficiently developed and aligned with needs? 
As showed in the structural analysis and as discussed above, codified (scientific) 
knowledge on offshore wind in the four analysed countries is produced by public research 
organisations, while technological (tacit) offshore wind knowledge is developed by large 
industrial players in their in-house R&D facilities. Both pools of knowledge (tacit and 
codified) expand as judged by the growing number of publications, journals and countries 
involved in offshore wind research, as well as by increased numbers of new products and 
solutions on the market (see for example section 3.4.2 on physical infrastructure/wind 
turbines). Also in the opinion of the interviewed stakeholders there has been enough 
knowledge developed in Europe on offshore wind. According to many of them, the research 
focus should now shift to making the technology cost effective, particularly in relation to 
wind turbines and cables.  
 
Our analysis and review of knowledge activities of the various actors (Box 2) show that the 
four analysed countries seem to ‘specialise’ in the development of technological knowledge 
in the particular areas of the value chain: Germany and Denmark in the wind turbine 
technology while the Netherlands in the construction of wind farms and foundations. While 
in Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands there is a longer tradition in offshore wind 
knowledge development, the UK is only now developing its national capacity by converting 
its fossil fuel oriented research programmes into renewables related curricula, with 
offshore wind as one of the themes (section 2.1.3 educational organisations). No 
specialisation can yet be observed in the UK in any particular knowledge area, rather the 
attempt seems to be to keep up with rapid market developments and train specialists who 
could operate and manage the newly built wind farms. These circumstances as well as a 
specific consultancy culture may have been the reasons why the UK has the most 
consultancies involved in advising on offshore wind out of all the analysed countries (see 
section 2.1.5 support organisations). 
 
From the European perspective, as taken by the stakeholders, there is indeed a lot of 
complementary knowledge developed in Europe, and the countries complement each other 
in their expertise and production of relevant knowledge. From the national perspective, 
however, it seems that countries are dependent on each other’s knowledge. The UK 
particularly, with its sizeable market and not very extensive knowledge development, 
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needs to rely on the knowledge activities of Denmark, the Netherlands and Germany. In the 
Netherlands, on the other hand, the poor offshore wind market may cause the academic 
knowledge production to lose its competitive edge, as a consequence of hindered 
interaction with, and insufficient feedback from, commercial innovation activities. To make 
good use of the domestic knowledge, Dutch actors would need to continue applying it to 
building foreign farms (as is the case in the field of foundation placing, where TU Delft 
works closely with van Oord and Ballast Nedam). 
 
We also conclude that sources of technological innovations in the field are not directly 
related with scientific breakthroughs at university. The analysis suggests that the real 
opportunities to innovate in offshore wind may actually come from advancements in R&D 
equipment, infrastructure and operation of the wind farms. This might imply that the 
codified knowledge on offshore wind is not very well aligned with the actual industrial 
needs. 
3.2.3. How does the function score? 
Based on this analysis we evaluate the function F2 - knowledge development at the level of 
excellent (5) in Denmark, strong (4) in the Netherlands (to acknowledge publications) and 
Germany (to acknowledge patents) and moderate (3) in the UK. The interviews evaluated 
this function highly even though the national activities in this area where not too strong. In 
so doing they wanted to emphasise that countries have good access to the European pool of 
knowledge on offshore wind, and lack of significant domestic activities in that area, e.g. in 
the UK, does not hinder the functioning of the national TISs.  
3.3. Knowledge diffusion (F3) 
Knowledge exchange is essential for innovation and for the build-up of innovation systems. 
It takes place in the process of interaction. In emerging systems the interaction takes the 
form of bi- and tri-lateral collaborations. In more mature innovation systems, networks 
emerge and they play a role in diffusion of knowledge in the system. To asses if there is 
enough knowledge exchanged between different actors’ groups e.g. science and industry, 
or users and industry, and across geo borders in the four analysed countries; we looked at 
the number and type of networks and tried to assess the general accessibility of 
knowledge. We complemented our findings on tacit knowledge diffusion with insights from 
qualitative research based on interviewing actors. 
3.3.1. Are there enough different types of networks through which knowledge can 
diffuse? 
Our analysis of different types of networks (section 2.2) demonstrated that knowledge 
networks based on collaboration on journal articles are not very extensive but rather 
sparse, with most co-authorship within the country, and with very poor involvement by 
industry. The collaborations on European research projects are much more frequent than 
on journal articles and with a more substantial involvement by industry. The UK, Denmark, 
the Netherlands and Germany emerge as most active collaborators on research projects in 
Europe. All four countries also have strong national research networks (such as Flow, 
Forewind or OWA). 
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Furthermore, even though most technological knowledge is developed by large industrial 
players in their in-house R&D departments, and despite the fact that the knowledge bases 
of these industries and knowledge institutes do not always coincide, companies in 
Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands do keep strong ties with universities. Denmark in 
particular, has close ties between public research organisations (such as Risø and DTU) and 
industry (Vestas) (Staffan Jacobsson, 2012), and German universities are involved in a 
number of programmes in close cooperation with industry (as presented in section 2.2.1 
on knowledge networks). Universities in these countries and in the Netherlands are valued 
for the number of specialised offshore courses, and they also provide industry with an easy 
access to good students who are then trained in-house and provided with hands-on 
experience. In the UK universities and other knowledge institutes do not yet have a good 
link with industries because, as many interviewees pointed out, they do not produce 
enough commercially-minded people. To address the problem, attempts have been made in 
2011 to prepare a special report examining career options in the UK offshore wind sector, 
featuring exclusive research, individual case studies, courses and employer information.  
 
All four countries have good industrial cooperation, such as between utilities and 
companies, with an increased collaboration between institutes form European countries 
along the value chain. Also lobby/political networks are strong and well established in all 
four countries and at a European level. EWEA is an important European provider of a 
diverse platform for contact and collaboration on offshore wind across geographical 
boarders.  
 
The value of a good network is recognised in all analysed countries. It is considered critical 
for the financing of new projects and finding a sufficient number of partners, such as risk 
insurers and banks, who can make the project bankable. In general there is, therefore, a 
sense of a relatively good level of knowledge diffusion in the offshore wind sector. Parties 
know each other and, if necessary, through partnerships and common projects they have 
the possibility to gain access to each other’s knowledge. In Denmark the Offshore Centre 
Denmark plays a particularly important role in the process of bringing incumbents and 
start-ups together at common events and pre-arranged meetings. However, the sharing of 
knowledge is not fully public and freely accessible. Particularly companies are wary of 
sharing their technological knowledge for fear of losing their competitive advantage. This is 
reflected by increasing efforts to protect innovations by patents. 
 
The geographical concentration and regional interactions may be related to the tacit, 
technological dimension of knowledge production. From the company perspective, 
knowledge is embodied in technologies, infrastructures and human resources. Due to its 
tacit and cumulative nature, this knowledge is very actor-specific and difficult to copy by 
others. To transfer tacit knowledge, close and intensive face-to-face contact between 
humans and organisations is needed, and geographical proximity is a vehicle to 
accommodate this type of communication. Knowledge accumulates at the regional level 
because key mechanisms through which knowledge diffuses across organizations are often 
spatially bounded. 
3.3.2. How does the function score? 
In view of the above discussion, and taking into account the opinion of the interviewees, we 
conclude that there is a good offshore wind network that crosses national borders, even 
though connections with universities are mainly local. We assess the function F3 – 
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knowledge diffusion in Denmark and Germany as excellent (5), strong in the Netherlands 
(4) and moderate in the UK (3). 
 
3.4. Guidance of the search (F4) 
Guidance of (or providing direction to) the search is a function that relates to all activities 
within innovation systems that can influence the visibility and clarity of the specific ‘wants’ 
among the users of technology. It is fulfilled either by industrial or governmental actors 
and provides a broad direction to the way in which financial resources are allocated. 
Therefore, to assess guidance of the search we have analysed the type of actors and their 
activities; impact of soft institutions (the level of governmental commitment, presence and 
reliability of policy goals and vision, expressed expectations); and influence of hard 
institutions (presence and quality of regulatory regimes, policy instruments and permitting 
procedure). 
3.4.1. Are there enough and suitable actors who provide guidance of the search? 
Offshore wind technology is still expensive compared to the fossil fuel technologies so its 
commercial operation in all four countries still is, and for the time being will remain, 
strongly dependent on nationally-financed support schemes such as obligation schemes or 
feed-in tariffs (either from the government budget or paid by the end-user). This strong 
dependence on national governments, that are not always stable in their commitments, 
negatively influences guidance and holds a risk of reduced legitimacy in which case foreign 
companies benefit the most from national efforts.  
Industry, however, through its involvement and activities may also contribute to providing 
guidance of the search. Our analysis (section 2.2 actors, Box 4) shows that the offshore 
wind industry in the four analysed countries is well developed and it is also determined to 
Box 3. Selected examples of knowledge diffusion events in the four analysed countries in 2011 
• Alstom Grid commissioned a 25 MW HVDC Demonstrator at its facilities in Stafford - a milestone in 
Voltage Source Converter (VSC) technology. The technology is required to deliver onshore the 
electricity generated from the Round 3 offshore wind programme and is critical to the creation of a 
robust European Supergrid (UK) 
• Danish blade supplier LM Wind Power in cooperation with French turbine manufacturer Alstom have 
developed the world's longest wind turbine blade (DK) 
• MAKE Consulting has published its annual Wind Turbine Trends report which provides a review of the 
current state of wind turbine technology evaluates new areas of innovation within the wind power 
industry and assesses the commercial impact of these trends. The report delivers a comprehensive 
component level analysis of a commercial, utility-scale horizontal axis wind turbine while maintaining a 
systems level perspective on the cumulative impact of strategic design decisions (DK) 
• Professional training programme on offshore wind started in Den Helder (with TU Delft and ECN) (NL) 
• Municipality expressed an ambition to develop a knowledge centre on offshore wind in Den Helder 
(NL) 
• An EWEA 2011 conference on offshore wind took place in the Netherlands (NL) 
• Powercluster project funded by EU with the goal to learn from experiences of oil and gas industry (NL) 
• The Federal State of Bremen expressed ambition to make Bremerhaven and Bremen the leading 
competence centre and production area for offshore wind energy in North-West Germany (DE) 
• Siemens opened UK Wind Power Research Centre at the University of Sheffield (DE-UK) 
• Windpower Monthly created a special report examining careers options in the offshore wind sector, 
featuring exclusive research, individual case studies, courses and employer information (EU).  
• Windpower Monthly launched Windpower Offshore, a free weekly email bulletin covering the latest 
news from the global offshore wind sector (EU) 
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continue its offshore wind activities in expectation of a big market and potential great 
return on its investments. The involvement of large offshore incumbents who diversify 
their business to offshore wind, as well as the growing number of new entrants in the area 
of turbine design, drive the system development regardless of the fragmented offshore 
wind policies in European countries. Persistency of, particularly, Dutch industry to enforce 
governmental commitment to the development of the system needs to be mentioned here. 
In 2011 the Dutch industry closed a so-called Green Deal with the government in which the 
latter committed to supporting the field43. However, critics argue that the Deal is only 
meant to camouflage the fact that the Dutch government lacks both vision as well as 
determination to act and take its earlier renewable energy commitments and obligations 
seriously. 
3.4.2. Do the soft institutions provide enough guidance of the search? 
Governmental commitment, its policy goals and visions about growth and technology 
design are important informal, soft types of institutions that have major impact on the 
guidance of the search. 
 
Our analysis of the soft type of institutions (section 2.3) as well as the activity patterns of 
the governments in the UK, Denmark, the Netherlands and Germany (see Box 4 for selected 
examples), reveal that the German government has the most clear and relatively consistent 
commitment to offshore wind among the four countries. In particular its decision to phase 
out nuclear power in the next 20 years44 serves the large-scale renewable market well, in 
which offshore wind has a significant share. This commitment provides entrepreneurs with 
great security with respect to planning and investing. It also makes German firms such as 
Siemens, Hochtief, OWT, and PNE international market leaders. Denmark has a new 
government (started autumn 2011) 45 which wants to set the goal to 50% of energy from 
wind and other alternative energy sources46. This raises hopes among the offshore wind 
industry for better times and good levels of taxes on coal and gas. In the UK offshore wind 
is a crucial element of the government’s plans to reduce the carbon intensity of the power 
sector, increase energy security and provide affordable energy to consumers. In the 
Netherlands, according to the stakeholders’ interviews, the current government does not 
have a clear vision or a stable framework in support of renewable activities. For this reason 
the guidance of the search provided by the government on the development of the 
domestic market is almost absent. Still Dutch constructors do belong to the group of 
international market leaders but, contrary to the German firms, they are not backed by the 
national government. This holds considerable future risks for the Dutch, and also to some 
extent for the Danish, in case Germany and the UK continue to support national industry. 
                                                        
43 Key concepts in this Green Deal included a substantial cost reduction through innovation and policy changes, strategic 
growth of the offshore wind market, achievement of the climate goals, as well as further experimental and shaping of the 
legislation. 
44 The plan concerns 17 of its nuclear power plants — which have met around 20% of its electrical power. 
45 http://www.denmark.dk/en/menu/About-Denmark/Government-Politics/ accessed 27 Apr 2012.  
46 At the moment of finalizing the revision of this report the New Danish Energy Agreement outlined the framework for the 
Danish climate and energy policy until 2020 and the direction until 2050. According to this agreement CO2 emissions in 2020 
will be 34 % less than they were in 1990. Energy consumption will decrease by 12 % in 2020 compared to 2006. Around 35 % of 
the country’s energy will come from renewable sources and almost 50 % of electricity will come from wind. It has also been 
decided to build a total of 3300 MW new wind power. A part of it is two new large offshore wind farms at Kriegers Flak 
between Denmark and Germany (600 MW) and at Horns Reef off the west coast of Jutland (400 MW).  
http://www.offshorewind.biz/2012/04/16/new-danish-energy-agreement-makes-denmark-safe-investment/ accessed 27 Apr 
2012. 
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The national policy goals expressed in the NREPs and driven by the common 20/20/20 EU 
goals on climate change, differ per country (see section 2.3 institutions). Even though some 
of our interviewees doubt whether the goals will be realised (the interviewees did not 
believe in the power of non-compliance mechanisms). Still, from the guidance perspective, 
the goals do constitute relatively stable drivers for the development of the offshore wind 
system. They also provide space for industrial activities, as an outcome of which there 
emerge common expectations of a large market and huge potential. What the goals do not 
do is provide any guidance with regard to grid improvements. There are different 
circumstances regarding grid integration in the four countries under study. The national 
governments lack a consistent and coordinated (at the European level) vision on how 
improvements in reliability and integration of the grid should be carried out. At the same 
time, there is a strong need to develop a pan-European grid and a cross-Europe regulatory 
framework and trade policies. Stakeholders believe that a coordinated effort in this respect 
will strongly drive the development of a European offshore wind TIS. Currently the EU took 
some preliminary steps towards harmonised grid integration measures. The first being a 
memorandum of understanding that was signed by ministers from 10 EU countries to 
develop an offshore grid that would serve entire Northern Europe. 
3.4.3. Do the hard institutions provide enough guidance of the search? 
In our structural analysis (section 2.3 Institutions) we have demonstrated that the four 
analysed countries differ between each other with regards to their regulating regimes and 
a set of offshore wind policy instruments. The UK, Danish and Dutch stakeholders all look 
up to the well-functioning German feed-in tariff. The tariff allows energy providers to be 
paid for all dispatched energy regardless of its amounts. The UK regulatory framework for 
offshore wind (Renewable Obligation Scheme ROC) also works well, but our interviewees 
considered the German scheme more generous and providing less uncertainty for the 
industry. Most criticised for not supporting the relatively ambitious policy goals was the 
Dutch scheme. The scheme is based on a tendering procedure and implies that offshore 
wind needs to compete with lower cost renewable technologies. This makes it unlikely that 
new offshore wind farms will be developed (except for the ones which were approved in 
previous tender rounds). In Denmark, the interviewed stakeholders strongly emphasised 
that the heavy energy taxes on renewable electricity are very problematic. They suggested 
that removal of these taxes would make wind able to compete with fossil fuels and would 
provide a clear guidance of the search in Denmark. 
 
All the four countries also suffer from increasingly long and non-unified across Europe 
permitting (consenting) procedure, which causes that projects get stuck in the planning 
system. There is further lack of common European trade code and uniform standards. The 
costs differ, so do subsidy schemes and targets. All these issues make it especially hard for 
the larger multinational companies that are active on international markets to operate 
effectively. 
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3.4.4. How does the function score? 
Overall, we conclude that the European goals provide a strong guidance for the offshore 
wind system development. The differing and changing national obligations less so, but they 
do give some space to the industry to experiment. Germany due to commitment of the 
government and a well-functioning feed-in tariff, has the strongest guidance of the search 
(function 4) out of all analysed countries. We evaluate it at the level of: excellent (5). The 
UK is evaluated at the level of: strong (4), Denmark is rated at: moderate (3) while the 
Box 4. Selected examples of events influencing guidance of the search  
• Expressed doubts whether investment costs would go down (more turbine supply, more vessels 
available) or go up (material scarcity, far offshore projects) (UK) 
• The UK renewables sector expressed belief that the offshore wind would play a crucial role in meeting 
a new target to reduce carbon emissions by 2025 by 50% based on 1990 levels (UK) 
• A UK government advisory body said that the UK government needs to limit its offshore wind plans as 
they are too expensive. 
• The UK government launched a task force to examine ways of reducing the cost of the UK’s offshore 
wind programme (UK) 
• The UK Government has issued assurances that offshore wind farm developers would be entitled to 
compensation if leases or agreements-to-lease awarded to them are withdrawn by the Crown Estate 
(UK) 
• Offshore wind expected to receive a huge boost in Denmark under the newly elected government's 
target for half of the country's total electricity demand to be met by wind power by 2020 (DK)  
• A report released by the government-appointed Commission on Climate Change Policy claiming that 
the offshore wind will be set to form the cornerstone of an energy revolution that would see wind 
energy account for 60-80% of Denmark's electricity needs by 2050 (DK) 
• In 2011 Denmark's wind industry faced a big challenge: its energy policy, implemented in 2008, 
expired. Expected is that Denmark would expand its offshore wind capacity as part of its plan to meet 
half of its electricity needs from wind energy by 2020 (DK) 
• The industry (>50 companies) and the Dutch Wind Energy Association (NWEA) convinced the Dutch 
government to sign the Green Deal Offshore Wind Energy (NL)  
• 5.2 GW ambition formulated in NREAP considered no longer objective for Dutch government, hardly 
any expectations from the government (NL)  
• Dutch government was criticised for putting more emphasis on the operating support needed for the 
wind farms than on the benefits (employment) for industry/the country (NL)    
• Dutch government considered a quota system for after 2015 but uncertainties arose as to whether 
the system would be designed in such a way (as the UK did) that offshore wind would get a chance 
(NL) 
• Innovation Platform expressed an opinion that the Netherlands should focus on offshore wind (and 
biomass options and domestic heat conversion) (NL)  
• Essent (RWE) moved away from offshore wind (NL)  
• Industry urged government to join projects and support infrastructure to develop home market (NL)  
• Expectation expressed that the Germany’s offshore wind farms, being built to replace most of the 
nuclear reactors closing in the next decade, are heading to miss construction targets because of 
delays in connecting turbines to the power grid (DE) 
• E-ON and RWE, the biggest German utilities, have threatened to halt investment in wind projects 
unless obstacles are removed, which RWE blames mainly on slow permitting and problems with 
acquiring cables and transformer stations (DE) 
• The construction of an offshore grid in the German part of the North Sea cannot be implemented 
under current regulatory system, according to European grid operator TenneT (DE) 
• Memorandum of understanding signed by Ministers from 10 EU countries to develop an offshore grid 
to serve Northern Europe (EU) 
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Netherlands is: weak (2) (non-existent on the part of government but strong on the part of 
industry). 
3.5. Market formation (F5) 
New technologies, sustainable in particular, being often far from optimised, frequently 
have to compete with very efficient matured and cheaper incumbents solutions. They need 
protected space to develop. Formation of a niche market with a set of supporting incentives 
is one of the possibilities. On the other hand the formation of a market around such 
emerging technologies and systems is a sign that they are developing and acquire 
increased legitimacy. To evaluate market formation in the four analysed countries we have 
looked into the size of the market (installed capacity, wind farms consented and planned) 
and the supporting incentives. 
3.5.1. Is the size of the market sufficient and are there adequate incentives? 
According to the EWEA (2011a), the European offshore market in 2020 will reach 6.9 GW, 
and that year the installed capacity will reach 40 GW. Some of our interviewees, however, 
doubt whether this potential will be realised. They believe the impact of the EU renewable 
goals is rather limited because of the limited power of the compliance mechanisms. The 
interviewees also expect that due to the current financial crisis renewables will not get 
much attention and definitely not much priority from national governments. Finally, 
according to the interviewees, the EU directives do not mandate how these goals should be 
achieved. That might imply that many countries may decide to continue with fossil fuels 
and buy renewables from abroad (on the condition that other countries have a surplus). 
From a legal perspective the targets, as specified by the EU Directive and in the national 
action plans, are mandatory. Countries will have to take measures to meet the goals. What 
is important for the governments now is to decide to what extent the development of 
offshore wind is crucial to meet their overall 2020 target. If it is, as in the UK, then there is a 
strong binding incentive from this target and hope for the offshore wind sector. 
 
All countries consider offshore wind as potentially huge, a multi-million euro market, able 
to provide hundreds of jobs domestically. The UK market is the world’s biggest, and 
therefore also considered sufficient for many international players. It is being driven by the 
Renewable Obligation Certificates regulation. Many actors think that the ROC system 
provides a huge payback and may be seen as a model subsidy scheme but it is not without 
limitations. Within the scheme energy companies are obliged to provide defined amounts 
of renewable energy. Failure incurs a fine, which is transferred as revenue to others who 
do meet the requirements. That means that there is no fixed price per ROC. This fuels the 
business of tracking the prices and to keep companies up to date, but is not beneficial for 
the offshore wind industry because no one produces more energy than necessary and after 
a certain level price flattens out. Furthermore, the ROC system does not encourage the 
supply chain development, so large volumes of supply chain are going through Germany 
and Denmark while construction activities go via the Netherlands. There is hardly any 
manufacturing in the UK and the risk for the UK is that Germany may very soon take over 
the leadership with regards to the size of the market. In Germany itself offshore wind is an 
extremely attractive market with huge orders. Commitment from the government and a 
well functioning feed-in tariff substantially support its development. Danish offshore 
market is not considered very big compared with the UK or Germany but with lots of 
experience and political will to achieve 50% of energy from renewables within which 30% 
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of the total is from offshore. The Dutch market is very limited with no new farms under 
construction in 2011. Three large-capacity ones for a total 1.8 GW (Bard 1 and 2 and Q10), 
are consented and planned for 2012/13 but they were a decision of the previous 
government. The current government does not have any concrete plans after 2012.  
3.5.2. How does the function score? 
Based on these considerations we conclude that the Netherlands and Denmark, without 
further steps, are in a danger of losing market shares at a European level. Denmark, due to 
low increase in installed capacity and consented projects, and the Netherlands, due to lack 
of new installations and for not supporting market development and innovative 
technologies. The UK has high ambitions but not too many consented projects, while 
Germany seems to be a true leader in market formation. We therefore evaluate the function 
F5 market formation: in Germany at the level of excellent (5), in the UK as strong (4), while 
in Denmark and in the Netherlands weak (2). 
 
3.6. Resource mobilization (F6) 
Resources in all forms: financial, human and physical are necessary as basic input to all of 
the activities within the innovation systems. Without these resources systems are unable to 
function. To evaluate the function resource mobilisation we have studied: availability of 
financial resources; availability of competencies and expertise and availability of physical 
infrastructure. 
Box 5. Selected examples of events influencing market formation  
• In 2010 the UK was the undisputed leader in offshore wind, with many expecting that it would retain 
that position in Europe until well beyond 2020 (UK) 
• Plans to install 3.5 GW of wind plants in the UK waters by the end of 2012. This is almost as much as 
the country has built onshore over the past 20 years (UK) 
• The House of Commons Committee on Climate Change has described the UK’s plans to develop 18 GW 
of offshore wind by 2020 as “a big gamble” (UK) 
• Danish energy group Dong's focus shifted towards offshore wind markets, particularly the UK, after the 
announcement that it is pulling out of the Midtfjellet onshore wind-farm development in Norway (DK)  
• Having been shut out of the UK’s Round 3, and with ambitious renewables targets of its own, Dong 
angled for a role in France’s offshore programme and remained open to buying into other zones 
around the North Sea (DK) 
• Government subsidy granted for two operational projects (NUON/Shell, Eneco) (NL) 
• € 4.9 billion government subsidy (operational support for 20 years) available for 3 projects to be 
developed: 2 from Bard (since August 2011: Typhoon Capital and utility HVC), one from Eneco, Q10 
(NL) 
• Permits have been granted for three other locations, but no subsidy available (NL) 
• The government proposed a 10% cut in its support for onshore wind and a 5% cut for offshore wind 
(UK) 
• Offshore wind development gathered momentum in Germany, with 80MW of capacity - in the shape 
of the first sixteen 5 MW turbines of the 80-turbine Bard 1 project in the North Sea - being online in 
December 2011 (DE) 
• Dong Energy has acquired the development rights to the Borkum Riffgrund West 1 project from 
Energiekontor (DE/DK) 
• Vattenfall has announced plans to build the 576MW Sandbank 24 offshore project off the German 
island of Sylt in the North Sea (DE) 
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3.6.1. What is the availability of financial resources? 
Based on the structural analysis (section 2.1.5 supportive organisations), analysis of 
functional pattern (see Box 6 for selected examples) and qualitative research, we have no 
strong evidence that the availability of financial resources (capital costs) has been very 
problematic. According to our interviewees however, availability of funds (capital costs 
and R&D funds) does create a significant barrier. The interviewees also emphasised that 
due to the crisis, the risks for banks in all four countries are very high so many banks have 
decreased their loans, which causes many projects to not be financially viable. This implies 
that increased numbers of banks and (international) financial organisations need to be 
involved in the financing of one project (bank clubs) and a number of insurers to take the 
risk on board (KPMG, 2010). At the same time, however, data shows that the number of 
wind farms is growing steadily and according to EWEA (2011c) there are more banks that 
are willing to finance offshore wind farms.  
 
Germany and the UK seem to have the most certain financial situation of all four countries. 
The financial certainty in the UK is assured until 2014, thanks to the locked-in 
commitments (with an average of 2 billion pounds per annum). In expectation of a big 
market and following the ambition of the UK government to make offshore wind a part of 
the UK renewable energy mix – work started on identifying additional sources of capital 
that would allow for funding the Round 3 projects (2017-2022)47. The UK also allocated 
significant investments in harbour infrastructure. It is a similar situation in Germany. 
Amongst the reforms, the government confirmed that the state-owned development bank 
KfW will provide up to €5 billion of financing to 10 offshore wind farms, and also 
announced that the planned reduction in subsidies for offshore wind developers will be 
delayed from 2015 to 201848.  
 
In Denmark there are many pension organizations who invest a great deal in wind 
(financial and industrial investments). They see a long-term profit from such investment 
because turbines are considered very reliable and wind is generally perceived as a safe 
business. By comparison, in the UK there is not enough confidence in technology (turbines 
are expensive so low risk turbines are preferred) which causes many pension funds to be 
locked-in to financing traditional big infrastructural projects. These projects still seem to 
the pension funds more reliable than the renewable offshore projects.  
 
In the Netherlands two large offshore wind farms are going to be constructed in 2012/13 
but offshore wind remains to be seen as a very expensive option in the near future. Despite 
large subsidies from the Dutch government, wind power provides merely 4 percent of 
Dutch electricity. The Dutch government is willing to invest in innovation to bring down 
the costs of offshore wind energy, but prices must come down considerably before large 
scale investments can again be supported. For the time being therefore, the government 
has stopped the subsidies for offshore wind power generation. 
 
Overall, to meet their national renewable energy targets all four countries will face 
financial challenges. Increased levels of investments will be necessary for new wind farms 
and incentives for technology development (through R&D and demonstration), grid 
                                                        
47 http://www.thecrownestate.co.uk/media/229356/owdf_04_01_finance_group_paper.pdf accessed 27 Apr 2012. 
48 http://www.businessgreen.com/bg/news/2100019/germany-enjoys-surge-offshore-wind-investment accessed 27 Apr 2012. 
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improvements and integration, harbours adjustments and development of clusters around 
the ports.  
3.6.2. What is the availability of competencies and expertise? 
With exception of the UK, availability of human resources at the moment of this analysis is 
not extremely problematic in any of the analysed countries. It may become a problem when 
the offshore wind system develops to meet the European renewables targets. Currently, in 
Germany and Denmark offshore wind is an attractive, well-paid field, but in the 
Netherlands young people are rather careful not to take the risk of educating themselves in 
a field that does not seem to have a big future. In the UK it still pays better to work for oil 
and gas than for the offshore wind industry. This has very serious consequences for the UK 
who has a rapidly growing market but a quite underdeveloped domestic value chain. The 
UK faces a serious shortage of personnel with all types of offshore wind skills and 
experience. Particularly electrical and structural engineers who can install and manage the 
new wind farms are of severe scarcity. In the remaining three countries the situation is 
better, still specific expertise is missing. In the Netherlands there is a lack of electrical 
engineers. Germany needs more engineers with practical experience while in Denmark 
marine engineers are in deficiency. Furthermore, Denmark expects a generation gap when 
current professionals will have to retire, and there will be either too few new experts, or 
they will have little practical experience. Shortage of skilled labour causes companies, 
being unable to find the experts at the universities, to try to attract them from other 
companies, which serves for a relatively high level of mobility of offshore wind experts in 
Europe. 
 
As demonstrated in the structural analysis (section 2.1.3. educational organisations), all 
four countries make attempts to address the problem of shortage of personnel with 
offshore wind experience by designing an increasing number of offshore wind educational 
programmes and courses. There is also intensifying European collaboration on education, 
which is a sign of the need to harmonise and coordinate the system at the European level. 
However, the courses and programmes are quite recent and very few compared to the 
needs. Europe-wide funding cuts for the higher education sector pose an additional threat.  
3.6.3. Is the physical infrastructure sufficient? 
Three issues repeatedly dominate the discussion in this area in all four analysed countries: 
the cost of technology, problems with cable infrastructure, and issues around the grid. Our 
structural analysis (section 2.4.2 physical infrastructure) and the events collated for this 
function (see Box 6 for examples) confirm that these are problematic areas. 
 
For technology the challenge is to develop the next generation of inexpensive but reliable 
turbines and foundations. This implies, on the one hand, the need for innovations (and the 
corresponding investment) but on the other hand the need to reduce costs. Standardisation 
is seen as one of the possible strategies to deal with the challenge because it allows for 
reduction of costs and automation of production (now, the lack of common design 
standards causes that manufacturers produce a great variety of turbine designs). A critical 
issue for the development of new turbines is the availability of rare earth elements: 
neodymium and dysprosium, which reserves are limited and hence there is an insufficient 
supply of these elements. 
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Grid stability and capacity is another serious issue in all of Europe. The European grid 
needs to be modified and renovated in a way that it can accept larger amounts of 
renewable energy. There are also difficulties with securing grid access with financial 
implications relating to where the connection takes place. Research suggests, for example, 
that connecting wind farms into hubs before connecting them to the grid is more cost-
effective than connecting them individually but no common grid strategy is as yet 
developed. All four countries have works underway to improve their part of the grid. The 
indecisiveness of many national governments with regards to the future energy mix, and in 
particular the renewables, makes any common action rather difficult.  
 
With regards to the cable installation, there are issues with fluctuating copper prices and a 
general lack of cables, especially the HV cables. Cable companies think that the problem 
with delivery of cables is because the orders reach them too late in the process of wind 
farm installation. The companies argue that cable orders should be made at the stage of the 
project development; otherwise there is no space to deliver the order. For cable companies 
offshore wind is not the only industry they supply with cables. They also provide to other 
sectors so large amounts are not always available at short notice, and if they are, the costs 
are incomparably higher making the costs of wind farm project suddenly higher than 
anticipated. 
 
Scarcity of vessels is not found to be very problematic at the moment of analysis. However, 
many interviewees emphasised that innovations are needed in the area of vessel 
adjustment to operation in deep waters >50m, and specialisation in performing different 
tasks. Now around 50-60 different types of dedicated vessels are needed for one farm 
installation. In the future, if the offshore wind system develops, the scarcity of specialised, 
deep water vessels may become a serious constraint. 
 
Finally, all countries have a great harbour capacity, particularly the Netherlands, the UK 
and Denmark who actively served the oil and gas industry. However, almost all harbours 
need to be adjusted to be able to assist the offshore wind operations. Some, such as 
Rotterdam, face societal opposition because their adjustment to meet offshore wind 
standards would imply territorial extension and intensification of activities and what that 
entails – noise, transport and pollution. 
3.6.4. How does the function score? 
In view of this discussion we assess function F6: resource mobilisation in the following 
way: financial resources in the Netherlands at the level of weak (2), in Denmark moderate 
(3) and Germany and the UK strong (4). Human resources we rate at the level of strong (4) 
in Germany and Denmark, moderate (3) in the Netherlands and weak (2) in the UK. 
Physical resources we evaluate as weak (2) in the UK and moderate (3) in the three 
remaining countries. 
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Box 6. Selected examples of resources mobilisation events  
• Report: thriving the UK offshore sector struggles to fill vacancies. Over the past year, a quarter of 
employers in the UK offshore wind sector reported hard-to-fill vacancies, compared with a national 
average of 3%. Applicants lacked the required experience in nearly half the cases reported, followed by 
insufficient skills (29%) or qualifications (14%) (UK). 
• The UK government announced the creation of two funds totalling £30 million for companies 
developing innovations for the offshore wind sector (UK) 
• A small harbour on the northern coast of Scotland better known for fishing and as a berth for the 
Orkney ferry was set for investment to turn it into an offshore wind and wave energy service port (UK) 
• Dong Energy signed a €240 million loan deal with the Nordic Investment Bank (NIB) to help finance the 
400 MW Anholt offshore wind farm (DK) 
• The Nordic Investment Bank (NIB) is loaning Norwegian grid operator Statnett €165 million to finance a 
new subsea cable between Norway and Denmark (DK) 
• The Danish Energy Agency has approved the acquisition by pension firms PKA and Pension Denmark of 
a 50% stake in the 400 MW Anholt offshore wind farm (DK) 
• Vestas received money from the UK's £1.4 billion (€1.6 billion) Regional Growth Fund (DK/UK) 
• Possibly extra €84 million from EU for new Eneco project (needs €400-450 million for investment) (NL) 
• Meewind invested €150 million in Bard projects (NL) 
• Limited capital available for grid extensions (Tennet) (NL/DE) 
• Professional training program on offshore wind started in Den Helder (with TU Delft and ECN) (NL) 
• Van Oord started its own training program. With underdeveloped home market, training seems to be 
essential to supply the international offshore wind market (NL) 
• Opinion: with current low ambitions there are no constraints regarding vessels (construction, 
maintenance, logistics). Vessels could become a major constraint in the case of a new government 
trying to catch up with earlier formulated ambitions (NL) 
• Opinion: global growth of offshore wind could potentially but not necessarily lead to scarcity of rare 
earth materials esp. neodymium en dysprosium, of which large quantities are required for direct drive 
permanent magnet generators used in several new turbine models (NL) 
• Opinion: cabling could become a supply constraint as of 2015 (NL) 
• Den Helder uttered ambition to become main harbour for offshore wind farms maintenance and 
logistics (NL) 
• German offshore wind electricity got partly lost due to grid problems (Dutch Tennet needs money to 
strengthen German grid) (DE/NL) 
• The €1.3 billion financing of the 400 MW GlobalTech1 wind farm in the North Sea closed, and is the 
biggest project financing in the offshore sector to date (DE) 
• The German Meerwind project was the first offshore wind farm to be led by private investors from the 
pre-construction stage (DE) 
• German developer Windreich acknowledged it is in discussions with car manufacturer VW over 
investment in one of its three permitted North Sea offshore wind projects (DE).  
• European grid operator Tennet warned it might struggle to install further offshore connections to 
North Sea wind farms due to a shortage of cables and cash (DE/NL) 
• Instead of heading for the bank, small wind developers are covering their equity needs for project 
development by inviting small investors to buy profit-participation rights known as Genussrechte (DE) 
• One of the world's largest private equity firms and one of its largest infrastructure banks announced 
plans to plough billions of Euros into Germany's fast-expanding offshore wind sector, after the 
government announced offshore wind farms will play a central role in its plans to phase out the use of 
nuclear power plants (DE) 
• The Meerwind project (288 MW, €863 million in long-term debt), closed in August. It was the first to 
take advantage of the new €5 billion program set up by KfW, Germany’s development bank, and the 
first to be brought to the market by a pure financial investor, Blackstone. It was supported by Eksport 
Kredit Fonden (EKF), the Danish export-credit agency (DE) 
   59 
3.7. Legitimacy creation (F7) 
For new technology to be economically successful it needs to become a part of the 
incumbent regime or even overthrow it. This causes the emerging technologies to be 
perceived by the incumbent actors as a serious threat. Incumbents therefore tend to 
oppose and resist the novelties. To overcome their resistance, advocacy coalitions are 
needed that would put the new technology on the political agenda, lobby for favourable 
conditions and resources and by doing so, create legitimacy for a new technological 
trajectory. To evaluate if there is enough creation of legitimacy we have therefore analysed 
the level of resistance to technology, the perceived level of competition between 
technologies and the extent to which the hard and soft institutions increase legitimacy. 
3.7.1. Do the hard and soft institutions increase legitimacy? 
The climate change debate and the climate targets, esp. the 20/20/20 goal including the 
NREPs provide firm legitimacy for renewables in general and for offshore wind in 
particular. Although, on the one hand, offshore wind is just one of the alternatives to fossil 
fuels and so it has to face competition from other renewables in gathering attention and 
financial resources (Jacobsson and Karltorp, 2012); on the other hand, it is the fastest 
growing renewable in the next decade. Target achievement without substantial offshore 
wind energy is therefore deemed to be hard in all four analysed countries.  
 
In terms of legitimacy in specific countries, much depends on the extent to which offshore 
wind is needed to meet the national RES target or the extent to which the national 
governments see offshore wind as a means to the development of national industry and 
creation of jobs. Germany and the UK have clear national visions on offshore wind and well 
developed support programmes to achieve the targets. These soft types of institutions are 
therefore considered by the interviewees as contributing most to increasing the legitimacy 
of offshore wind in the two countries. In Denmark offshore wind is also seen as a major 
future contributor to the energy production and with the new greener government, has a 
serious chance to develop. In the Netherlands: the lack of vision, absence of any consistent 
programme and poor subsidy scheme, are the factors most limiting the legitimacy of this 
renewable. 
 
The soft institutions, especially the expectations regarding the robustness and availability 
of technology and markets, are in our view very optimistic, and given that the long testing 
period of the design has not yet taken place, they are also difficult to evaluate. They may 
turn risky if the system up-scales too rapidly. Not meeting the expectations may create 
tensions. Risk perception is another issue that is of great importance for such a very capital 
intensive sector as offshore wind. Banks are often risk-avoiding and unwilling to finance 
wind farms comprising new wind technology without track record. At the time of the 
financial crisis many banks lowered their offshore wind energy project funds making it 
difficult to install a wind farm without involvement of more financial organisations. 
Furthermore, uncertainties about the grid connection and overall lack of alignment of the 
vision on grid improvements additionally hinder the legitimacy creation. 
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3.7.2. Is there resistance towards the technology, project set up or permit 
procedure? 
In none of the analysed countries is there significant opposition to offshore wind farms as 
long as the wind turbines are not visible from the shore and there is no huge impact of 
construction on the local public. Municipalities worry about societal resistance when farms 
in the vicinity of 20km from shore are being planned. Particularly in Denmark there is good 
acceptance of the technology because it brings revenues and jobs. In Germany, which has 
the strictest environmental requirements, some marine biologists criticised the noise 
pollution from drilling and installing the foundations and pillars. To deal with the problems 
as they arise, continuous environmental assessments and ongoing testing are conducted in 
parallel to installation and operation of the farms. Germany expects this to create a 
competitive advantage with respect to complying with international standards that other 
countries might not be able to fulfil yet. In the Netherlands, legitimacy of the offshore wind 
technology is relatively low due to political resistance, high costs and competition for space 
in the North Sea.  
3.7.3. How does the function score? 
In view of this discussion and accounting for interviewed experts’ opinion we rate function 
F7: creation of legitimacy at the level of moderate (3) in the Netherlands and strong (4) in 
the UK, Germany and Denmark. 
Box 7. Selected examples of legitimacy creation activities in 2011 
• Limited interest at global level in investing in offshore wind compared to other RES technologies.  
• Opinion:14% binding RES target still there, but (crucial) role offshore wind not recognized (NL) 
• Opinion: offshore wind leads to creation of jobs (NL) 
• Opinion: offshore wind as an alternative for onshore wind (NIMBY) (NL) 
• Opinion: offshore wind not being an alternative for onshore wind (too expensive) (NL) 
• Opinion: coal power plants become less efficient with more offshore wind, on a net base more CO2 (NL) 
• Permits for two farms not granted because of harbour interests and birds (NL) 
• US entrepreneur and TV celebrity Donald Trump has upped the ante in his fight against a 100 MW 
offshore wind farm planned for the Scottish coast (UK) 
• BWEA predicts that the development of offshore wind industry will eventually add some £60bn to the 
UK economy and save 800 million tonnes of CO2 emissions. The development of the sector will also 
create between 67,000 and 115,000 new jobs (UK) 
• Construction of offshore wind farms off Germany's northern coast in the North and Baltic Seas faced 
significant delays, even as the country's utility companies tackle one project after another abroad. 
Things have fallen so far behind that government officials are happy to see anything happen at all (DE) 
• Opinion: According to HSBC, the global offshore market is predicted to grow at approximately 29 
percent between 2009 and 2020, with Germany set to be a major contributor (DE) 
• TenneT informed the German government that construction of grid connections for offshore wind farms 
in the North Sea was no longer possible, either at the present pace and under current conditions (DE) 
• Opinion: Denmark would be forced to allocate several more offshore wind zones to meet the expanded 
new wind target laid out by the elected government, predicts Dong chief executive. Added to its 
ambitions for biomass, the new wind goal (50% electricity from wind) means Denmark would likely blow 
its EU-mandated 31% renewable-electricity target out of the water, further boosting the green 
credentials of a country that pioneered the wind-energy business in the 1970s and 1980s, and plays 
home to Vestas, the world’s largest wind-turbine supplier (DK) 
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3.8. Functional dynamics in 2011 
Figures 15-18 give an overview of system function fulfilment in the four analysed 
countries. The numbers on the figures present the strength of the functions: 1-absent, 2-
weak, 3-moderate, 4-strong, 5-excellent. 
 
 
Figure 15. Overview of system function fulfilment in the Netherlands 
 
 
 
Figure 16. Overview of system function fulfilment in UK 
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Figure 17. Overview of system function fulfilment in Germany 
 
 
 
Figure 18. Overview of system function fulfilment in Denmark 
 
Comparison of the functional pattern of the four TIS’s at hand (Figure 19) reveals that 
entrepreneurial activities score relatively well in all four countries but are strongest in 
Germany. In knowledge creation it is Denmark that excels while the UK scores relatively 
low. Knowledge diffusion is strongest in Germany and Denmark but low in the UK. 
Guidance of the search is by far the strongest in Germany, strong in UK but very weak, 
almost absent in the Netherlands. Market formation processes are by far the best in 
Germany, not bad in UK but very weak, almost non-existent in the Netherlands and 
Denmark. Resources mobilisation is equally weak in all four analysed TISs while legitimacy 
creation scores on average slightly higher than resources function but still equally low in 
all four places. 
 
Based on the functional analysis we can therefore conclude that there is not only a strong 
need for, but in fact already an emergence of, a European offshore wind innovation system. 
Figure 19 shows the extent to which the national TISs contribute to the European 
   63 
innovation system. A very strong indicator of European system emergence is the visible 
complementary specialisation of the four countries in entrepreneurial experimentation 
and knowledge creation. While in the national context this specialisation may have rather 
negative implications such as loss of national legitimacy or leakage of financial resources, 
from the European perspective it works to the advantage of the system. Creation of a 
European market, integrated grid and common regulatory framework would be very 
beneficial for the European system and would further significantly enhance the system 
development. 
 
 
Figure 19. Comparison of system function fulfilment in all four analysed countries 
4. Discussion and conclusions  
Having analysed the structure of the four offshore wind innovation systems (Section 2) and 
having assessed how they function (Section 3), we can proceed to the identification of 
weaknesses that hinder their development. In a specifically defined innovation system four 
types of systemic problems can be identified: actors, institutional, infrastructural and 
interaction problems. They are identified based on the analysis of the factors that hinder 
specific functions. These factors are then attributed to the structural components of the 
system (mapped in Section 2), which makes it possible to specify which of them need to be 
altered and how, in order to improve the performance of the entire system. This provides a 
very systematic input to policy decision making and the design of an integrated tool that 
can address the weaknesses in a more orchestrated manner. 
4.1. What hinders the functioning of the innovation systems? 
Our analysis shows that in the Netherlands entrepreneurial activities (F1) are most 
hindered by a limited home offshore wind market caused by the lack of political support. 
Also the changing renewable policy of consecutive cabinets results in changing regulatory 
regime and ineffective support programmes that fail to support the ambitious goals. 
Denmark since autumn 2011 has a new greener government, which raises hopes among 
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entrepreneurs for new pro-renewables politics49 but the 2011 low rate of increase in 
installed capacity did not stimulate much of entrepreneurial activity. In the UK 
entrepreneurial activities are held up by the underdeveloped value chain, in particular lack 
of any manufacturing capacity and poor availability of skilled labour. This causes a quite 
significant presence of large foreign incumbent companies in the UK value chain and little 
space for national new entrants. In Germany, where the government is committed and the 
feed-in tariff does its job, entrepreneurial activities are not hindered by any specific factor. 
 
Even though offshore wind is an emerging field there seems to be enough knowledge 
produced (F2) (in Europe) not to create a serious barrier for the system development. 
However, the tacit character of knowledge that drives the offshore wind innovation system 
has several implications. One of them is that it causes a lack of cross-fertilisation between 
knowledge produced at universities and by industrial parties. This is most visible in the 
Netherlands. Knowledge institutes have a high publication record and they claim to work 
closely with industry, but the industry does not patent and knowledge produced at 
universities (e.g. on rotor techniques) does not always translate into a national 
manufacturing capacity. This divergence unnecessarily delays the system development. 
Limited governmental commitment resulting in a poor domestic market and unfavourable 
R&D conditions, as well as funding cuts for higher education, are two other factors that are 
responsible for the slowing down of the knowledge development in the Netherlands. In 
Germany the knowledge base is fairly strong; especially technological knowledge is well 
developed which is observable in the high level of patents by Siemens. The codified 
knowledge is produced in Germany in a great number of institutes. It is difficult to assess 
the extent to which this dispersed model hinders the knowledge development. It may have 
negative implications for creation of critical mass and for stimulation of education that is 
close to research. In the UK the knowledge base on offshore wind does not have a long 
tradition and is only now being organised. It is also quite fragmented and not very strongly 
linked to national strategies, which may account for its overall lower impact and education 
of skilled labour. The number of educational programmes is growing but insufficiently to 
the needs of the industry. Lack of specialisation in any of the offshore wind areas and 
shortage of manufacturing capacity in the country may be both the outcome of and the 
reason for the poor knowledge base in the UK. In Denmark the knowledge base is in good 
shape (knowledge institutes with good publication records and patents by Vestas), but 
what creates unnecessary uncertainty for companies who plan R&D investments in 
Denmark is that the R&D programmes are negotiated annually as part of the government’s 
fiscal budget and not on a longer term perspective.  
 
Function knowledge diffusion (F3) is mainly hindered by the dominance of the 
tacit/technological type of knowledge and the problematic transfer of university 
knowledge to a specific context of application. Germany and Denmark are exceptions. Both 
countries’ wind industry sector employs great numbers of people and there are large and 
informal industry-university networks. Hence diffusion of technology in both countries is 
comparatively good. In the Netherlands, however, the small domestic market does not 
allow for an immediate feedback from the industry to university; while the UK quite 
strongly depends on the knowledge transferred from abroad and has not yet developed 
any significant expertise that can be diffused to other countries. In the situation when the 
                                                        
49
 See footnote 46. 
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offshore wind innovation system is driven by the tacit /technological type of knowledge, 
companies in all four analysed countries are, understandably, not very eager to share their 
know-how in fear of losing their competitive advantage. 
 
Guidance of the search (F4) is in all four countries hindered by the uncertainties around 
wind turbine technology, vessels, cables supply (especially HV cables), increasing costs per 
kWh, and a protracted permitting procedure. Also, since offshore wind is a young 
technology it strongly depends on political support. The national governments however 
are not always stable in their commitments. Particularly in the Netherlands, the 
unfavourable government policy for renewables and lack of a suitable support scheme 
negatively influence the guidance of the search. The Green Deal negotiated by the Dutch 
offshore wind industry is often criticised for being a camouflage for the government’s lack 
of vision and determination to act and take its earlier renewable energy commitments and 
obligations seriously. This does not provide any strong guidance. In Denmark, guidance of 
the search was in 2011 hindered by the lack of strong commitment from the earlier 
government but is improving ever since new ‘green’ cabinet was selected in October 2011 
and released the New Danish Energy Agreement. In the UK the administrative barriers, 
such as a great number of authorities involved in the authorisation procedure and slow 
approval rate, have negative impact on the guidance of the search. In Germany this function 
is not visibly hindered. However, lack of clear grid strategy and of a truly European market, 
as well as long consenting procedures, are issues that hold up the guidance of the search in 
all four analysed countries. Problematic for the guidance is also the perception of the 
20/20/20 goals as not really binding and not specifying how the targets should be met. 
 
For market formation (F5) there is a serious technical barrier on how to feed-in the extra 
offshore wind power into the existing grid, and how to bring the costs of the technology 
down to acceptable levels. In the future for all countries, the availability of cables and 
specialised vessels that can work on deeper waters may also become problematic. 
Furthermore, all four analysed countries suffer from the shortage of particular types of 
experts (mainly engineers) and availability of funds. Non-aligned institutions, especially 
regarding the grid, strongly hinder European market formation. There is no strong belief in 
the noncompliance mechanisms and ambiguity about how the targets should be met. 
Furthermore, the UK ROC system is not considered as very supportive to the supply chain 
development and there is no manufacturing capacity in the country. For the UK the need to 
adjust the harbours and organise incentives for the development of clusters around the 
ports is an additional challenge. In Denmark the current low rate of increase in installed 
capacity and consented projects is a barrier to market formation. In the Netherlands the 
national policy and poor support scheme force the major offshore wind contractors to get 
involved in international projects. Financial crisis and related increased perception of risks 
additionally cause that banks reduce their renewable energy projects funds, hence more 
financial organisations and more insurers are needed before the project is made bankable. 
This trend is common in the UK, Denmark, the Netherlands and Germany and impacts 
market formation in all four analysed countries. 
 
Resources mobilisation (F6) is mostly hindered by financial crisis and growing risks, 
availability of finance in Europe, lack of skilled labour, in particular engineers and 
insufficient educational courses that can train experts. Furthermore, grid access and 
capacity is a major issue, and so is the lack of regulations and of a vision on possible grid 
improvement strategies. Also availability of cables caused by late orders and the price of 
copper, as well as insufficient harbour infrastructure, influence legitimacy creation in all 
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four analysed countries. In the UK lack of a strong knowledge base and manufacturing 
capacity, as well as lack of an offshore wind tradition cause the field to not be seen as 
attractive by young people. In the Netherlands perception of the technology as being very 
expensive significantly slows down resources mobilisation.  
 
Legitimacy creation (F7) is hindered by: competition with other renewables; competition 
for space in the North Sea and lack of binding targets beyond 2020. Uncertainties around 
grid connection and lack of common vision also have a (negative) impact on legitimacy 
creation. The dominance of large utilities as owners and operators of national projects may 
have some additional negative bearings, mainly on social acceptance of the technology 
applied in projects, which is partially based on access to public finance by smaller parties. If 
the funds begin to be streamlined to the large utilities this may raise issues with legitimacy 
of the system. Particularly in the UK it also holds a risk of reduced legitimacy in which case 
foreign companies benefit most from national efforts. In the Netherlands lack of vision and 
an adequate support scheme play the biggest role in hindering legitimacy creation. 
4.2. Systemic policy challenges in the European offshore wind innovation 
system 
Offshore wind technology holds the potential for tackling major energy issues, climate 
change problems and creating jobs and economic growth. However, according to the JRC 
report (2011) the electricity production costs associated with this technology are still 
higher than for conventional technologies. This creates a serious barrier for its further 
diffusion. The analysis presented in this report showed that from an innovation 
perspective offshore wind is a young and very dynamic system driven by the engineering 
knowledge developed by in-house R&D centres of the industry. To develop further, though, 
three innovation system’s processes need to be improved by policy. These processes 
include: resource mobilisation (as described by function F6), market formation (function 
F5) and legitimacy creation (function F7). These processes can only be enhanced by policy 
through intervention into the structural elements that build the innovation systems. We, 
therefore, group the related specific policy challenges into four aspects: institutional, actor-
related, infrastructural and issues concerning connectivity within the system. These policy 
challenges require a systemic, coordinated policy effort at a European level if the system is 
expected to contribute to the goals of climate change reduction and stimulation of green 
growth. In this section we briefly discuss the challenges.  
 
Institutional alignment of national policies, instruments and regulatory framework is an 
absolute precondition that can pave the way for other policy enhancements. The varying 
support schemes, the long and often complex consenting procedure, as well as lack of 
training standards, need to be tackled to allow for achievement of the national targets and 
ambitions. The development of a uniform grid strategy for Europe and the establishment of 
a pan-European electricity trade code are of particular importance. Most importantly, 
however, offshore wind requires stable and long-term political support. This support is of 
utmost relevance to the reduction of the perceived risks (by banks for example), to 
addressing of the issue of competition with other renewables and to the increase of the 
attractiveness of the sector as a whole. Clarification of- or provision of a guideline on- how 
the national targets should be met and what the non-compliance mechanisms are, would 
supply additional incentives to the system’s development. 
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Addressing issues related to the absence of specific actors in the value chain as well as 
improving the capabilities of the present ones, should be the second major aspect of the 
policy dedicated to offshore wind. The analysis shows that particular countries specialise 
in specific aspects/phases of the value chain as well as in specific aspects of knowledge. A 
pan-European collaboration that would turn this specialisation into an advantage and help 
create a complete and highly competent European value chain could become very 
beneficial to the offshore wind system in general and to the European strategic position in 
the field in particular. Although the national value chains seem quite dynamic as can be 
judged by the share of incumbents and new entrants, policy attention should, however, still 
be focussed on keeping the balance and also on stimulating innovation from medium and 
smaller enterprises by e.g. removing various barriers to entry, or reduction of risks and 
uncertainties. Another actor-type of challenge, of great urgency and significance to offshore 
wind system development, is that of addressing the shortage of skilled labour (especially 
engineers), by the provision of high quality educational courses and various training 
activities.  
 
The third element of the systemic offshore wind policy concerns infrastructural aspects: 
knowledge, physical and financial. With regard to the knowledge infrastructure – provision 
of R&D on both technical (turbines, specialised vessels, grid and cables) as well as non-
technical issues of offshore wind energy (cost-effectiveness of technology) should receive 
priority. Concerning physical infrastructure – further support of national activities devoted 
to the enhancement of harbour infrastructure should be provided. The European 
coordination of work on grid capacity enhancements is also critically important. A pan-
European action plan on grid infrastructure would be especially advantageous. Regarding 
financial infrastructure, the availability of finance to both R&D as well as the capital costs of 
wind farm installation is essential. Such financial support could take the form of capital 
grants, production tax credits and tax reduction for offshore wind, soft loans, credit 
guarantees etc. 
 
Lastly, although there are no major challenges related to interaction within the offshore 
wind innovation system, nevertheless, the connectivity between some actors could be 
enhanced. This refers especially to the formal collaboration between science and industry 
in order to diminish the current divide between codified knowledge produced by 
universities, and technological knowledge produced by industry. In particular industry 
needs incentives that would help them increase their confidence in sharing knowledge 
while knowledge institutes are in need of good stimuli to produce knowledge that industry 
finds useful and applicable. Collaboration with oil and gas producers on the active transfer 
of their experience to the offshore wind system would provide additional advantages. 
 
An orchestrated systemic policy instrument, for the offshore wind innovation system, built 
around the four types of challenges, would, in our view, be essential to the diffusion of 
offshore wind technology, and it would significantly contribute to the achievement of the 
European 2050 vision of moving to a competitive low carbon economy (EU, 2011). 
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Introduction 
The most important insight that has dominated the field of innovation studies in recent 
decades is the fact that innovation is a collective activity. It takes place within the context of 
a wider system. This wider system is coined ‘the innovation system’ or ‘the innovation 
ecosystem’. The success of innovations is to a large extent determined by how the 
innovation system is build up and how it functions (Hekkert et al., 2007, Bergek et al., 
2008).  
 
The concept of the innovation system stresses that the flow of technology and information 
among people, enterprises and institutions is key to an innovative process. It stresses the 
interaction between actors who are needed in order to turn an idea into a successful 
process, product or service in the marketplace. 
 
Many innovation systems are characterized by some flaws that greatly hamper the 
development and diffusion of innovations. These flaws are often labeled as system failures 
or system problems. Intelligent and evidence based innovation policy therefore evaluates 
how innovation systems are functioning, tries to create insight in the system problems and 
develops policies accordingly (Smits and Kuhlmann, 2004,Klein Woolthuis et al., 2005,Van 
Mierlo et al., 2010,Negro, S.O., Alkemade, F., Hekkert, M.P., 2011). 
 
This manual contains instructions and explanations on the analysis of technological 
innovation systems for policy purposes. While literature about technology and innovation 
is abundant, the need for a single reference specific to the analysis of technological 
innovation systems for policy purposes prompted the development of this manual. This 
manual is not a definitive reference on the topics covered and is not meant to substitute for 
texts or journal articles. The manual is intended to serve as a convenient guide for any 
policymaker performing analysis of technological innovation. 
 
The manual is based on the Technological Innovation System approach as developed by 
Utrecht University in cooperation with other European institutes like Chalmers University 
in Sweden and EAWAG in Switzerland. Technological Innovation System is a concept 
developed within the context of the Innovation System approach focusing on explaining the 
nature and rate of technological change. A Technological Innovation System can be defined 
as the set of actors and rules that influence the speed and direction of technological change 
in a specific technological area (Hekkert et al., 2007, Bergek et al., 2008, Markard and 
Truffer, 2008). 
 
The purpose of analyzing a Technological Innovation System is to analyse and evaluate the 
development of a particular technological field in terms of the structures and processes 
that support or hamper it. The basic steps that are taken are the following: 
 
First, we analyse the structure of the innovation system. These are the actors and rules that 
make up the system. Second, we analyse how the system is functioning. We will use seven 
system functions that stem from theory and are empirically validated as indicators. We 
analyse each function, but also the interaction between the functions. Finally, after we have 
established at what state of development a technological innovation system is, we can 
analyse the system problems that block the well functioning of the innovation system. 
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All innovation systems can be characterized by the same basic building blocks or 
components. These are actors, institutions, networks and technology. Examples of actors 
are organizations responsible for education, R&D, industrial activities, and consumers. 
Examples of institutions are supportive legislation and technology standards. Examples of 
networks are the linkages between organizations in research projects and advocacy 
coalitions.  Technology is part of the innovation system as it enables and constrains the 
activities of actors in the innovation system. We will present a categorization of all 
components that are important in a Technological Innovation System and we will develop 
indicators to measure the size of these components. In this manual these will be applied to 
the case of the offshore wind innovation system as an example. 
 
Even though different innovation systems may have similar components, they may function 
in a completely different way. Therefore, measuring how innovation systems are 
functioning is considered as the big breakthrough in innovation systems research. In a 
number of scientific articles lists of evaluation criteria are presented to evaluate how 
innovation systems are functioning. These assessment criteria are labelled in the literature 
‘functions of innovation systems’. In Hekkert et al. (2007) (2007) the following functions of 
innovation systems are put central: 
 
1. Entrepreneurial activities,  
2. Knowledge development,  
3. Knowledge exchange,  
4. Guidance of the search,  
5. Formation of markets,  
6. Mobilization of resources, 
7. Counteracting resistance to change.  
The important difference with the structure of the innovation system is that these system 
functions are much more evaluative in character. Focusing on functions allows us to 
address the performance of an innovation system. In other words: the structure presents 
insight in who is active in the system, the system functions present insight in what they are 
doing and whether this is sufficient to develop successful innovations.  
 
In addition to quantitative indicators, the functioning of an innovation system needs to be 
assessed by experts or key stakeholders that are active in the innovation system.  
 
The reason to evaluate the innovation system by means of expert opinions is that it is 
impossible at the moment to solely evaluate an innovation system based on quantitative 
criteria. The reason for this is that technologies and regions are different from each other 
and that it is impossible to define an optimal configuration of the innovation system. 
Consequently, benchmarking innovation systems is difficult; what works in one country 
may not work in another country. Furthermore, the development of an innovation system 
often depends strongly on the competition in other parts of the world and very often has 
very technology specific dynamics. For some technologies much more R&D funding is 
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necessary than for others. Therefore, the best way to assess the functioning of the 
innovation system is by involving a sufficient amount of experts in the evaluation.  
 
However, just asking how the innovation system scores on the different functions is not 
sufficient. The seven functions are quite broad in their description and a much more 
detailed set of indicators is necessary to make sure that the answers by the respondents 
are comparable. The function knowledge development can for example be measured by 
asking about the quantity, the quality and the direction research activities. Therefore, very 
specific diagnostic questions need to be developed to assess the functioning of innovation 
systems.  
 
In summary, in order to monitor the development of emerging technologies, this manual 
offers 5 steps that will be described in detail to perform the innovation system analysis. 
The first steps describe the mapping of the structure and functioning of the innovation 
system. After establishing the stage of development, step 4 and 5 identify the main barriers 
and provide handholds for appropriate policy making. 
 
 
Figure 1. Schematic representation of the 5 steps in analyzing a technological 
innovation system for policy analysis 
 
 
Step 1 Structural analysis 
The structure of the innovation system consists of innovation system components. We 
distinguish between four types of components: 
 
1. Actors: Actors involve organizations contributing to a technology, as a developer or 
adopter, or indirectly as a regulator, financer, etc. It is the actors of a Technological 
Innovation System that, through choices and actions, actually generate, diffuse and 
utilize technologies. The potential variety of relevant actors is enormous, ranging from 
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private actors to public actors, and from technology developers to technology adopters. 
The development of a Technological Innovation System will depend on the 
interrelations between all these actors.  
We distinguish between the following actors categories: 
 
a. Knowledge institutes  
b. Educational organizations  
c. Industry  
d. Market actors  
e. Government bodies and Supportive organizations  
2. Institutions: Institutional structures are at the core of the innovation system concept. It 
is common to consider institutions as ‘the rules of the game in a society, or, more 
formally as the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. A 
distinction can be made between formal institutions and informal institutions, with 
formal institutions being the rules that are codified and enforced by some authority, 
and informal institutions being more tacit and organically shaped by the collective 
interaction of actors. Even though informal institutions have a strong influence on the 
speed and direction of innovation, they are impossible to map systematically. 
Therefore, in the mapping of the innovation system structure, we focus on the formal 
policies that are in place that are likely to affect the development of the focal 
technology. 
3. Networks: The central idea of the innovation system framework is that actors function 
in networks. In the case of networks it is interesting to map the geographical focus of 
the networks. Do the networks have a localized or globalized character? 
4. Technological factors: Technological structures consist of artifacts and the 
technological infrastructures in which they are integrated.  
In figure 2 the actors and institutions are represented that play a role in the 
development, diffusion and implementation of the technology. The different actors 
interact with each other in networks that develop or diffuse the technology. However 
these interactions are not represented in the figure. All together the four pillars (actors, 
networks, institutions and technology) form the structural components of the 
innovation system. 
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Figure 2. Structure of the innovation system (based on Kuhlmann and Arnold, 2001) 
 
 
Determining the system structure 
To create insight in the structure of the innovation system the components (Technology, 
actors, networks and institutions) need to be mapped.  The list below outlines the steps 
and questions that need to be answered, in addition to some key sources of information. 
 
Technology; What are the technological trajectories? 
 
Technological trajectory refers to a single branch in the evolution of a technological design 
of a product/service. As such, a technological trajectory is a set of technologies that 
consistently develop over time in certain direction. In this process an accumulation of 
knowledge takes place. Sometimes, different (and competing) technological trajectories 
exist. 
 
Technologies also involve the techno-economic workings of such artifacts, including costs, 
safety, and reliability. These features are crucial for understanding the feedback 
mechanisms between technological change and institutional change.  
 
Patent classifications can provide an overview of the set of technologies (and their 
trajectories) that is relevant for the TIS under study. An overview of the International 
Patent Classifications (IPC) can be found at the WIPO. 
 
   76 
The most convenient overview of patent data is provided by the WIPO database that can be 
found at http://www.wipo.int.  Alternatively, the EPO database offers free access to more 
than 70 million patent documents worldwide, containing information about inventions and 
technical developments from 1836 to today. Always use the advanced options for 
bibliometric searching. 
Also the US Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) offers World-Wide Web (Web) access to 
bibliographic and full-text patent databases. The USPTO patent database can also be 
accessed at http://www.google.com/patents. 
Actors; Who are the actors? 
 
Industry; Describe the value chain of the different technological trajectories 
 
Value chain analysis describes the activities within and around a set of organizations, and 
relates them to an analysis of the competitive strength of these organizations. Therefore, it 
evaluates which value each particular activity adds to the products or services relevant to 
the TIS under study. This idea is built upon the insight that an organization is more than a 
random compilation of machinery, equipment, people and money. Only if these things are 
arranged into systems and systematic activates it will become possible to produce 
something for which customers are willing to pay a price. Porter argues that the ability to 
perform particular activities and to manage the linkages between these activities is a 
source of competitive advantage.  
 
In most industries, it is rather unusual that a single company performs all activities from 
product design, production of components, and final assembly to delivery to the final user 
by itself. Most often, organizations are elements of a value system or supply chain. Hence, 
value chain analysis should cover the whole value system in which the organization 
operates. 
 
Please note that not every TIS contains a complete value chain!  
 
Often consultancies, sector organizations and government organizations have information 
available on the different organization active in a sector. It is desirable to have an 
indication of size of the market in terms of total turn-over or number of employers. 
 
Research; Describe the state of the knowledge system 
 
Technological innovation systems differ greatly in terms of the knowledge base and 
learning processes related to innovation. First, knowledge may have different degrees of 
accessibility (Malerba-Orsenigo, 1997) i.e. opportunities of gaining knowledge that are 
external to firms. This knowledge may be internal to the sector (thus favoring imitation) or 
external to the sector (thus affecting the availability of technological opportunities to 
incumbents and new firms). In both cases greater accessibility of knowledge decreases 
industrial concentration.  
 
The sources of technological opportunities markedly differ among technological innovation 
systems. In some cases opportunity conditions are related to major scientific 
breakthroughs in universities. Opportunities to innovate may often come from 
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advancements in external R&D, equipment and instrumentation. Possibly, external sources 
of knowledge in terms of suppliers or users may play a crucial role. 
 
a. Which parties develop knowledge?  
The codified knowledge base is well archived in the form of scientific publications. 
Several databases exist; the Science Citation Index, SCOPUS and Google Scholar. Of 
these, the Science Citation Index provides the most robust scientometric information. 
CORDIS, the Community Research and Development Information Service for Science, 
Research and Development, is the official source of information on the European 
framework programs; it offers interactive web facilities that links together researchers, 
policymakers, managers and key players in the field of research.  This search allows you 
to search quickly and easily all CORDIS content at once. This data permits a detailed 
assessment of the collaborations among institutions within the fields under study and 
its growth over time. 
 
b. Where are the knowledge producers located? 
Often, knowledge production is geographically concentrated in a relatively small 
number of locations. Especially when accessibility of knowledge is difficult, there is a 
tendency of increasing geographical concentration. If external knowledge is easily 
accessible, easily transformable into new artifacts and exposed to a lot of actors (such 
as customers or suppliers), then innovative entry may take place (Winter, 1984). On the 
contrary, when advanced integration capabilities are necessary (Cohen-Levinthal, 
1989) the industry may be concentrated and formed by large established firms. 
The uneven distribution becomes clear when measuring the clustering of knowledge 
production. All publications contain one or more author addresses that can be used to 
map the geographical distribution. 
 
c. How much knowledge is developed?  
The question of growth of knowledge is central in understanding patterns of 
innovation, and according to Bonaccorsi (2008) the direction of growth (converging or 
diverging) is a defining attribute of a sector. Opportunities for new developments are 
large when the knowledge base is fast growing and diverging.  
 
d. What are the types of organizations involved in knowledge production? 
Knowledge production involves different types of actors with different roles; 
universities, companies, and governments. This Triple Helix model assumes the 
traditional forms of institutional differentiation among universities, industries, and 
government as its starting point.  The model thus takes account of the expanding role of 
knowledge in relation to the political and economic infrastructure of the larger society 
(Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 2000). 
 
Education; Are the education needs met? 
 
In important aspect of the functioning of an innovation system relates to the match 
between the educational system and the entrepreneurial needs. In most cases, it will be 
difficult to obtain information about the extent to which the educational system provides to 
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the needs/demands of entrepreneurs and researchers (partly due to privacy issues). Only 
in rare occasions sector organizations or universities have labor market statistics available 
of graduates from universities. 
 
A general indication of the match between the educational system and the entrepreneurial 
needs is provided by the intensity if university-industry collaborations in knowledge 
production as indicated by co-authorships. Also the existence of special professorial chairs 
at universities funded by companies can provide insight in the educational organization 
providing relevant skilled labor. 
 
Market; What does the market look like? 
 
The most important question concerning the nature of the market is related to the demand 
side; which organizations provide demand for the technology under study? Furthermore, is 
demand technology specific or not? 
 
From Schumpeter to Porter innovation-thinkers have recognized the importance of an 
advanced market, of well articulated critical demand as a driving force for innovation. An 
important distinction here is the extent to which private companies provide demand in 
relation to the public (governmental) demand. Often, very generic government initiatives 
exist such as educating the consumers or highly specific initiatives like procuring new 
technologies. 
 
Politics and policy; What are the policy goals related to the TIS? 
 
ERAWATCH provides information on European, national and regional research policies, 
actors, and programs in the EU and beyond. The policy goals and instruments with respect 
to the Technological Innovation System are an important aspect in understanding the 
functioning of the TIS. Relevant questions here are; How big is the variability of policy 
goals? What kind of policies, regulations, programs are there with respect to the new 
technology? How reliable is the policy? (Is it based on previous programs, regulations, 
instruments or is it completely different) 
 
Intermediaries; Which parties try to engage collaboration between different parties? 
 
In the interaction between Universities, Governments and Industry there are many 
intermediary organizations that facilitate the exchange of knowledge and resources. In 
addition to ERAWATCH , which provides information on European, national and regional 
research policies, actors, and programs there are consultancies, sector organizations and 
government organizations that have information available on the intermediary 
organization active in a sector. 
 
Networks; What does the network look like? 
 
Network analysis views relationships in terms of networks of nodes and ties. Nodes are the 
individual actors within the networks, and ties are the relationships between the actors. 
The resulting graph-based structures are often very complex. Networks play a critical role 
in determining the way problems are solved, organizations are run, and the degree to 
which organizations succeed in achieving their goals. Using data from CORDIS (project 
collaborations) and SCI (co-authored publications) we can establish what kind of formal 
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relations occurred in the between organizations related to the technological trajectory. A 
central question here is; Who are the central players in the system? 
 
Step 2. Determining the phase of development 
Structures involve elements that are relatively stable over time. Nevertheless, for many 
technologies, especially newly emerging ones, these structures are not yet (fully) in place. 
For this reason, scholars have recently enriched the literature on Technological Innovation 
Systems with studies that focus on the build-up of structures over time. The central idea of 
this approach is to consider all processes that contribute to the development, diffusion, and 
use of innovations as system functions. These system functions are to be understood as 
types of processes that influence the build-up of a Technological Innovation System. Each 
system function may be ‘fulfilled’ in a variety of ways. The premise is that, in order to 
properly develop, the system should positively fulfil all system functions. 
 
The way of how the structure and the functioning of an innovation systems should be build 
up is dependent on the phase of development of the technology. If the technology is still in 
an early phase of development than the innovation system has a different structure and 
certain functions are more relevant than those for a more mature technology. In order to 
monitor an innovation system it is first important to determine the phase of development. 
This is necessary to be able to evaluate whether the innovation system performs well with 
relation to the phase of development. 
 
If the technology is diffused to a certain extent then the TIS should be of a certain maturity. 
On the other hand a certain size of a TIS determines the extent of diffusion of the 
technology. To determine the phase of development of the technology and the TIS, the 
international TIS is positioned on the diffusion curve (see Figure 4). The diffusion curve of 
a technology describes the extent of diffusion on international level of the technology and 
has the shape of an S-curve. The curve describes the process of development, application 
and further diffusion of the technology. The S-curve can be divided into different phases. 
The first is the pre-development phase where a prototype is produced, i.e. the first evidence 
that the new technology works. Then in the development phase the first commercial 
application occurs where the new technology or product is sold for the first time and 
enters the market without subsidy. In the next phase, the take-off phase, the technology or 
product will be diffused on a larger extent and the market will grow further, i.e. 
acceleration phase, until saturation occurs and the degree of diffusion stabilizes, i.e. 
stabilization phase. 
 
In order to determine in which phase of development the technology resides, diagnostic 
questions can be asked. If the answer is yes then the technology is in the next phase of 
development. 
 
Pre-development phase: is there a working prototype? 
 
Development phase: Is there commercial application? 
 
Take-off phase: Is there a fast market growth? 
 
Acceleration phase: Is there market saturation? 
 
   80 
 
Figure 3. Phase of development 
 
In each phase of development the structure and functioning of the innovation system is 
different. After determining the phase of development of the technology it can be 
determined whether the innovation system is build up in a correct way and whether it can 
make the move towards the next phase. The characteristics and criteria’s that the structure 
and functioning of a system need to fulfil will be explained in the next steps.  
 
Step 3. System functions 
Even though different innovation systems may have similar components, they may function 
in a completely different way. Therefore, measuring how innovation systems are 
functioning is considered as the big breakthrough in innovation systems research. In a 
number of scientific articles lists of evaluation criteria are presented to evaluate how 
innovation systems are functioning. These assessment criteria are labeled in the literature 
as ‘key processes of innovation systems’ (system functions). In Hekkert et al. (2007) the 
following system functions are put central:  
 
1. Entrepreneurial experimentation,  
2. Knowledge development,  
3. Knowledge exchange,  
4. Guidance of the search,  
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5. Formation of markets,  
6. Mobilization of resources, 
7. Counteracting resistance to change.  
The important difference with the structure of the innovation system is that these system 
functions are much more evaluative in character. They state how an innovation system is 
performing. The functioning of an innovation system needs to be assessed by experts or key 
stakeholders that are active in the innovation system.  
 
The reason to evaluate the innovation system by means of expert opinions is that it is 
impossible at the moment to solely evaluate an innovation system based on quantitative 
criteria. The reason for this is that technologies and regions are different from each other 
and that it is impossible to define an optimal configuration of the innovation system. 
Consequently, benchmarking innovation systems is difficult; what works in one country 
may not work in another country. Furthermore, the development of an innovation system 
often depends strongly on the competition in other parts of the world and very often has 
very technology specific dynamics. For some technologies much more R&D funding is 
necessary than for others.  
 
Therefore, the best way to assess the functioning of the innovation system is by involving a 
sufficient amount of experts in the evaluation by asking them very specific diagnostic 
questions, whether the amount of activities are sufficient and whether they form a barrier 
for the innovation system to further develop and move towards the following phase of 
development. Most of the data has already been collected during the structural analysis, 
but with asking the experts an assessment can be done about the quality of the innovation 
system. 
 
Table 1. Overview of System Functions and diagnostic questions for analyzing the 
functioning of the Innovation System  
Functions  Diagnostic questions Sub-questions 
F1-
Entrepreneuri
al 
experimentati
on  
Is there enough 
entrepreneurial 
activity? 
-  Are there sufficient and right type of actors that 
contribute to entrepreneurial experimentation?  
-  Are the number and type of activities of these actors 
sufficient?  
F2-Knowledge 
development 
Is there enough 
knowledge 
developed? 
-  Are there enough and right type of actors who develop 
knowledge? 
-  Is the amount and type of knowledge developed 
sufficient and aligned with needs?  
F3- 
Knowledge 
exchange 
Is there enough 
knowledge exchange? 
-  Are there enough of networks of different kind 
through which knowledge can diffuse?  
F4-Guidance 
of the search 
Is there enough 
guidance of the 
search? 
-  Are there enough and right type of actors who provide 
guidance of the search? 
-  Do the soft institutions provide enough guidance? 
 Is governmental commitment sufficient? 
 Are the policy goals and vision in terms of growth 
and technology design clear and reliable? 
 Are the overall expectations aligned and do they 
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reduce uncertainties? 
-  Do the hard institutions provide enough guidance? 
 Are the regulatory regimes, policy instruments 
and permitting procedure supportive? 
F5-Market 
formation 
Is there enough 
market formation? 
-  Are the size of the market and the incentives 
sufficient?  
F6-Resource 
mobilization 
Is there enough 
resource 
mobilization? 
- What is the availability of financial resources? 
- What is the availability of human resources?  
- Is the physical infrastructure sufficient? 
F7-
Llegitimacy 
creation 
Is there enough 
creation of 
legitimacy? 
- Do the hard and soft institutions increase legitimacy? 
- Is there resistance towards technology, construction 
process, and permit procedure? 
 
Analysis                                                                                                                                                                             
In this step the system functions need to be scored on a 5 point likert scale (1 = very weak 
and 5 = very strong) in order to identify how well each system function is fulfilled and 
which system function forms the largest barrier that should be targeted by 
recommendations.  
 
In the spider-diagram below (Figure 4) the extent to which each system function is fulfilled 
will be represented. The system function with the lowest scores can be seen as the most 
problematic ones.  
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
F1 - Entrepreneurial
experimentation and production
F2 - Knowledge development
F3 - Knowledge exchange
F4 - Guidance of the searchF5 - Market formation
F6 - Resource mobilisation
F7 - Counteract resistance to
change
 
Figure 4. Overview of system function fulfilment 
 
However in order to be sure which system function forms the biggest barrier we need to 
relate the presence and fulfilment of the system functions to the phase the IS is in. Not 
every system function is as important as other system functions in each phase.  
 
The fulfilment of the system functions varies per phase of development of the technology. 
In each phase different system functions play an important role depending on the aim of 
the phase. The build up of the innovation system occurs over time throughout the phases 
which results that the fulfilment of the system functions is cumulative (i.e. more knowledge 
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is build up). Therefore all system functions need to be fulfilled in order to support the build 
up of the TIS in question.  
 
Figure 5 shows possible functional patterns per phase. The black arrows are the relations 
that occur in the current phase, whereas the grey arrows represent the relations that 
occurred in previous phases and are still occurring in order to further improve the 
development of the technology into 2nd or 3rd generations. In this way the system functions 
fulfilment differs over time but since the system functions influence and interact with each 
other they reinforce each other contributing to the build up of the innovation system. 
 
 
Figure 5. Functional patterns per phase 
 
For the pre-development phase we expect that knowledge development is the most critical 
system function. This system function may be negatively influenced by a poor performance 
of other system functions, such as knowledge exchange, guidance of the search and 
resource mobilization. Thus these four functions deserve most attention in the analysis 
when in this phase. The other system functions are expected to be less influential. 
 
For the development phase we expect that entrepreneurial experimentation is the most 
important system function as the first experiments and pilot plants are set up that will 
show whether the innovation also works in practice. All other system functions may 
positive or negatively influence this system function. So all system functions may be critical 
in this phase and will need to be thoroughly analysed.  
 
For the take off phase, entrepreneurial experimentation and production is critical. In this 
phase entrepreneurs should really become system builders. Therefore counteract 
resistance to change and build legitimacy (F7) is also a critical system function. Guidance of 
the search, resource mobilization and market formation are important supportive 
functions. Knowledge development and exchange are most likely to be less critical in this 
phase.  
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For the acceleration phase market formation is the most important system function, as a 
growing market fuels the innovation system to develop and diffuse further. Supportive 
functions are entrepreneurial production, resource mobilization and guidance of the 
search. The other functions are most likely to be less critical.  
 
If the most important or supportive system functions of a particular phase are missing or 
are unfulfilled then they can block the build up of an innovation system. By identifying 
which system function blocks the further development of the Innovation System, 
appropriate policy recommendations can be formulated to remove this barrier. 
 
Step 4. Structural cause for functional barriers 
The outcome of the previous analysis is the identification of a number of system functions 
that can form an obstacle for the progress of technological development. These obstacles 
can block the development and diffusion of the technology. In this step the causes for the 
hampering will be identified.  
 
The causes can origin in the structure of the TIS. The system functions that are badly 
fulfilled are a manifestation of problems in the structure. By identifying where the 
problems are within the system the barriers can be removed. For example if function 
knowledge development is badly fulfilled than the cause could be related to the lack of 
knowledge institutes and universities that provide the appropriate courses to educate 
people that can work with the new technology. By identifying the problems in the structure 
these can then be removed or improved.  
 
If the government develops policy to improve and facilitate the functioning of the TIS, then 
the new policy will be included in the structure which will influence the functioning of the 
system.  
 
In order to find the causes in the structure of the system the following steps will be 
followed: 
 
1. Determine which system functions are forming a barrier.  
2. Determine for each system function which structural component forms a barrier. 
Look at the following structural components: 
a. Actors, different groups/parties 
b. Networks, relations and cooperation between parties 
c. Institutions (formal and informal regulations; these have not been elaborated 
on in step 4, so need to analyse them in depth here) 
d. Technology, the knowledge related to technology  
e. External factors/Context. For example competition between two TISs. 
3. Describe the relation between cause and barriers. What are the functional 
consequences of the causes in the structure and what are the functional 
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consequences of the competition between several TIS? Do the barriers have to do 
with a lack of structural components or with lack of quality? What are the effects of 
the structural components on the functioning of the system – which system 
functions improve or become worse due to structural problems? 
Step 5. Obstacles for policy goals 
Innovation policy is about helping companies to perform better and contributing to wider 
social objectives such as growth, jobs and sustainability. There are many policy tools 
available to achieve this, ranging from establishing supportive framework conditions (e.g. 
human resources, an internal market, intellectual property) to facilitating access to finance, 
policy benchmarking and enabling collaboration or stimulating demand, for instance, 
through regulation, standards and public procurement.  
 
However, the choice of policy instruments depends on the identified structural cause for 
functional barriers in the innovation system, as well as the precise goal of a policy and the 
geographical and technological scope of the TIS under study.  
 
Therefore it is important to determine the policy goal of the respective innovation system 
because new emerging energy technologies provide different opportunities which can lead 
to different policy goals and changes of these goals over time. For the interpretation of the 
results it is important to determine what the goal is. 
 
By policy goals we mean the vision of the government with respect to the societal 
contribution of renewable energy technologies. These can be short- or long-term goals for 
renewable technologies, i.e. PV or wind, or societal themes, i.e. sustainable mobility? The 
policy goals with respect to renewable energy technologies can be determined along 2 
dimensions: 1) environmental/energy goal: contribution to CO2 emission reductions, 
guaranteed energy supply and reduction of fossil fuel dependency; 2) economic goal: value 
and contribution of emerging sectors such as renewable energy technologies related to 
economic growth in and export of the home country. One goal does not exclude the other 
but they can be different and will have an effect on the evaluation of the functioning of the 
innovation system. The optimal configuration of an innovation system will then be 
dependant of the policy goals. 
 
If the policy goal is to obtain economic profit then a lack of the system function market 
formation does not need to be a problem if the technology is exported but not implemented 
in the home nation. On the other hand if a large amount of the technology is important to 
achieve environmental/energy goals a lack of system function knowledge development 
does not need to form a problem as the goal is achieved. In this step the link needs to be 
made between the results of the analysis of the structure and the functioning of the ideal 
TIS. In this step the most important barriers need to be ranked in order to provide 
recommendations on how to achieve the policy goal.  
 
Finally, an important insight from innovation studies is that there are different relevant 
spaces for public intervention, since some technological developments require 
international policies while others are the realm of regional policies. This means that the 
location of new policy programs and the geography of technological innovation more 
broadly, is subject to path-dependent dynamics where innovations may prosper in some 
locations and become marginalized in other locations (Arthur 1994).  
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